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ABSTRACT
Present procurement practices for purchase of
commercial, commercial off-the-shelf, and non-developmental
products and services take thirty days and sometimes years
to procure and deliver to the end user. Federal Government
contracting offices spend costly amounts of time
advertising the actions and preparing formal solicitation
documents for each purchase order generated by the end-
user. This translates to high administrative costs, high
prices, and at times marginal performance. This research
offers alternative procurement practices through a single
award indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract
accessed through an advanced electronic system, which is
maintained in accordance with commercially established
practices. Further comparisons are made with the growing
popularity of multiple-award contracts as these procurement
instruments affect competition, pricing and socio-economic
issues.
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Current purchases of commercial off-the-shelf-items
(COTS) and non-developmental items and services, such as
spare parts or grounds maintenance, can take up to two
years to procure and reach the end users. These
procurement administrative lead times (PALT), the yard-
sticks by which contracting activities are graded, are
lengthy as a result of the Government’s inability to
capture the efficiencies of proven commercial practices.
Legislation through the Federal Acquisition Streamlining
Act of 1994 (FASA), which redefined commercial purchasing,
and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 (FARA),
later renamed the Clinger-Cohen Act, reshaped how the
Government interacted with industry to purchase supplies
and services.
Using electronic commerce and electronic data
interchange systems, the Government discovered innovative
ways to streamline procurement business practices, thereby
reducing PALT. The creation of Multiple Award Task Order
Contract instruments (MACs), familiarly known as Indefinite
Delivery, Indefinite Quantity Contracting Instruments or
IDIQs, has also changed the way contracting agencies buy
supplies and services, reduced PALTs and implemented FASA
and FARA. However, MAC instruments have come under
legislative and commercial scrutiny by Congress, the
Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG), the
National Aerospace Space Agency Inspector General (NASA
IG), and the Small Business Administration (SBA). Misuse
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of these contracting tools has had a negative impact on
competition, pricing and socio-economic goals.
B. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
This research explores the use of an advanced
electronic purchasing system. This electronic system will
increase the effectiveness of IDIQs, generate more
competition, and take advantage of market efficiencies or
best practices to maximize competition without overly
regulating the process. Furthermore, this advanced
electronic system should reduce PALT to near zero, increase
performance, influence best value pricing, while surpassing
socio-economic goals and reducing Government aggregate
expenditures.
C. WHAT IF THE PROBLEM IS NOT SOLVED
On the horizon, the Acquisition Law Advisory Panel,
commonly referred to as the Section 800 Panel, has proposed
two Defense Authorization Bills, Section 801 and Section
803. Section 801 will mandate the oversight of a MAC Czar
to enforce the potential legislation. Section 803
threatens to impose more competition on MACs for purchases
over $100,000. This means that if DoD fails to receive the
minimum number of bids to satisfy the rule, DoD may have to
compete the actions under full and open competition rules.
Sixty billion dollars were spent last year through MACs,
and there would be potentially 600,000 procurement actions
to perform the same functions. (Dembeck, Federal Times, May
2002) The result, if the competition rules on MACs are
changed, will be increased costs, over burdened workforces,
and higher prices for the Government.
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D. DISCUSSION
The vision of the Federal Acquisition System has
always been to:
Deliver on a timely basis the best value product
or service to the customer, while maintaining the
public’s trust and fulfilling public policy
objectives. Participants in the acquisition
process should work together as a team and should
be empowered to make decisions within their area
of responsibility. (See Federal Acquisition
Regulation Part 1)
The Office of the Federal Procurement Policy, and
Office of Management and Budget Executive Office of the
President, concluded that since the passing of the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA), all Federal
Departments and Agencies have begun initiating procedures
to determine contractor past performance information in
source selection. The FASA states:
Past contract performance of an offeror is one of
the relevant factors that a contracting official
of an executive agency should consider in
awarding a contract. It is appropriate for a
contracting official to consider past contract
performance of an offeror as an indicator of the
likelihood that the offeror will successfully
perform a contract to be awarded by that
official. (DAD, Best Practices, 2000)
Furthermore, recording a contractor’s performance
information periodically during the performance of a
contract is a strong motivator for contractors to maintain
high quality performance or improve inadequate performance
before the next reporting cycle. This is a basic
ingredient of “best practices” for good contract
administration, and is one of the most important tools for
3
ensuring contract performance, while also ensuring best
value for the Government.
Since the inception of FASA, contract vehicles have
been created to streamline lengthy procurement procedures,
which have contributed to long waiting periods for
procurements and bidding periods. These waiting periods
incur an extensive administrative overhead cost that is
eventually passed on to the Government. Particularly,
multi-award task order contract instruments (MACs), such as
the Government-wide acquisition contracts (GWACs), have
been developed to procure information technology supplies
and services while becoming the center of attention since
FASA. GWACs serve two important purposes. The first is to
spread the use of multiple-award task order or delivery
order contracting authorized in FASA, which has decreased
procurement acquisition lead time clocks (PALT) using
Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 14 and 15 procurement
actions. The second is to promote the spread of best
practices that promise better results from information
technology investments. (Kelman, 1999)
In fiscal year 2000, purchases made through GWACs rose
to more than $13 billion dollars. This is within a mere
six years from when they were authorized, and they continue
to gain popularity according to an exhaustive study by Fed
Sources Inc., a technology market analysis firm
headquartered in McLean, VA. (Harris, August 27, 2001)
Although GWACs are focused primarily on Information
Technology (IT) services and equipment, these contract
vehicles have allowed agencies to issue task and delivery
orders against other multiple-award schedules via a
4
percentage fee, instead of having to initiate new
contracts. They offer a way to avoid complicated and
lengthy processes of open competition and contract
negotiation. However, GWACs have come under scrutiny due
to an increase in sole-source awards without full and open
competition, and have become a source of controversy among
small business advocates because of contract bundling.
This research involves a detailed description and
analysis of MAC instruments by considering whether MACs
support the “best practices” that obtain performance-based
contracts. Furthermore, it addresses whether Government
agencies are properly competing these contracts to meet the
requirements outlined in Parts 6 and 16 of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation, as well as fully supporting the
Government’s socioeconomic initiatives. Finally, by
demonstrating the benefit of an advanced electronic system,
the researcher introduces business alternatives that can
achieve the best value for the Government.
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
• What are the current acquisition problems and
issues associated with current procurement
practices of MAC instruments to meet the
requirements of competition, provide best value
prices and meet socio-economic goals? To what
extent can an advanced electronic system improve
on those procurement problems and issues?
2. Secondary Research Questions
• Why have Government-wide Acquisition Contracts
(Type of MAC or GWAC) become the procurement tool
of choice for a plethora of Government agencies?
• Why has the misuse of these GWACs become a
political target for Congress and the Small
Business Administration (SBA)?
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• What advantages/solutions can an advanced
electronic system bring to the current
procurement system and Acquisition Reform?
F. SCOPE OF THESIS
The scope includes: (1) a background review of
fundamental policy changes supporting acquisition reform
that led to the development of MACs; (2) an examination of
economic problems associated with poor purchasing
discipline and incentives, which have led to shoddy
procurement activities and unintended consequences; (3) how
a pure electronic purchasing system can address the
identified problems of the current purchasing practices;
and (4), additional political issues and concerns
associated with the need for an advanced electronic
procurement system.
G. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this thesis research consists
of the following steps.
• Conduct a comprehensive literature search of
books, magazine articles, CD-ROM systems, and
Internet based materials.
• Conduct a comprehensive review of Government
reports concerning issues with MACs addressed by
Small Business Administration (SBA), GSA,
Government Accounting Office (GAO), DoD Inspector
General (IG) and NASA IG.
• Conduct visits to and interviews with contracting
offices, SBA and their associated programs and
offices, GSA and key personnel associated with
the development of an advanced electronic system
during the program development and program beta
testing.
• Conduct portal modeling of MAC procurement
behavior and impacts as outlined in the DoD IG,
GAO and NASA IG findings on MAC activity.
6
• Conduct a cost-benefit analysis or evaluation of
using the advanced electronic system as a key
procurement vehicle.
7





Best value means the expected outcome of an
acquisition that, in the buyer’s estimation, provides the
greatest overall benefit in response to the requirement.
(NCMA Pub, 1998)
2. Bundling
Consolidating requirements is the process of awarding
large umbrella contracts and eliminating numerous smaller
contracts. (GAO, 1998)
3. Competition Policy
“10 U.S.C.2304 and 41 U.S.C.253 require, with certain
limited exceptions (see Subparts 6.2 and 6.3), that
contracting officers shall promote and provide for full and
open competition in soliciting offers and awarding
Government contracts.
“Contracting officers shall provide for full and open
competition through use of the competitive procedure(s)
contained in this subpart that are best suited to the
circumstances of the contract action and consistent with
the need to fulfill the Government’s requirements
efficiently (10 U.S.C.2304 and 41 U.S.C.253).” (FAR Part 6)
4. Consideration Policy
“The contracting officer must provide each awardee a
fair opportunity to be considered for each order exceeding
$2,500 issued under multiple delivery-order contracts or
multiple task-order contracts, except as provided for in
paragraph (b)(2) of this section. Paragraph (b)(2)
exceptions are: (i) The agency need for the supplies or
9
services is so urgent that providing a fair opportunity
would result in unacceptable delays; (ii) Only one awardee
is capable of providing the supplies or services required
at the level of quality required because the supplies or
services ordered are unique or highly specialized; (iii)
The order must be issued on a sole-source basis in the
interest of economy and efficiency as a logical follow-on
to an order already issued under the contract, provided
that all awardees were given a fair opportunity to be
considered for the original order; or (iv) It is necessary
to place an order to satisfy a minimum guarantee.” (FAR,
Part 16.5)
5. Federal Acquisition Reform Act/Clinger-Cohen Act
(FARA)
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (formerly known as the
Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 (FARA)) and the
Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996
(ITMRA) further advance the changes made by FASA. The
Clinger-Cohen Act provides a number of significant
opportunities for DoD to further streamline and reduce non-
value added steps in the acquisition process. Among the
most significant changes authorized by the Act is a test of
the use of the Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) for
commercial items between the simplified acquisition
threshold of $100,000 and $5 million. This should allow
DoD to reduce its administrative costs and the overhead
costs for DoD’s vendor base for purchases of relatively low
risk items. This change eliminated Government-unique
requirements previously cited by industry as a barrier to
doing business with DoD. The Act also provides the
authority for contracting activities to use SAPs for all
10
requirements between $50,000 and the SAP while the
Government works to fully implement Electronic Commerce/
Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI).
6. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA)
On January 25, 1994, the 103rd Congress passed Senate
Bill 1587, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of
1994, which President Clinton signed into law. Running
over 74,000 words, this bill streamlines the acquisition
process by: (1) replacing the existing “small purchase
threshold” of $25,000 with the “simplified acquisition
threshold” of $100,000; (2) creating the category of the
“micro-purchase”, with some powerful implications for
purchases below $2,500; and (3) mandating that the Federal
Government create a network for spreading electronic
commerce. (Federal Mall)
7. MULTIPLE AWARD INDEFINITE DELIVERY INDEFINITE
QUANTITY CONTRACT (IDIQ)
A multiple award IDIQ contract allows agencies to
award multiple task and delivery orders covering the same
scope of supplies or services and award orders for specific
work after giving each contract holder a fair opportunity
to be considered. These MACs can be made available to
other Government agencies, especially those offering
information technology (IT) products and services in the
form of Government-wide acquisition contracts (GWACs).
Multi-agency use comes pursuant to the Economy Act. Also,
the scope of a multi-agency contract need not be limited to
IT.
8. Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT)
This period of time begins when a complete and valid
procurement request is received in the contracting office,
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and ends when the acquisition is awarded and complete
distribution of the contract document has been made. PALT
standards, in calendar days, for processing actions are as
follows: (DAD, NGFARS Part 7.105)
Table 1. Procurement Administrative Lead Time Chart.
REQUIREMENT <=$2.5K $2.5K-$25K $25K-$100K >$100K
EDI 15 15 15 None
SUPPLIES 15 30 60 120
SERVICES 15 45 90 180
CONSTRUCTION 15 60 120 180
A-E 15 60 120 180
9. Sole-Source Procurement
Sole source acquisition means a contract for the
purchase of supplies or services that is entered into by an
agency after soliciting and negotiating with only one
source. The following criteria authorize the Government to
justify sole-source procurements: (DAD Information Guide,
Volume II, 1998)
• Patents, data rights and copyrights
• Only one responsible source and no other
supplies or services will satisfy agency
requirements
• Unique capabilities, supplies or services
available from only one source
• Unusual and compelling urgency
• Industrial mobilization requirements
12
• International agreement(s)
• Requirement by statute
• Public interest
B. CURRENT PROCUREMENT PROCESS
Acquisition of commercial items over the micropurchase
price of $2,500 can take up to thirty days, and purchases
over $100,000 can take up to a year to receive. Acquiring
non-developmental items such as submarines, ships, or
aircraft repair parts can take up to two years in extreme
cases. Government services contracts, such as military
housing refurbishing, grounds maintenance or janitorial
services, etc., have taken up to three years to award.
“The generic contracting process starts with a
customer inputting data into an automated purchase request
system (APRS). This request is
automatically/electronically sent to the fund’s
administrator in the comptroller’s office, who approves the
request and assigns a line of accounting (LOA) to the
request. APRS obligates the necessary funds for the
acquisition and automatically updates the Defense Financing
Accounting System (DFAS). Once it is determined that the
purchase request requires a contracting action, the
contracting officer (KO) ensures there is enough
information in the requirement to properly compete the
acquisition among potential offerors in the open market.
If the request requires clarification, the KO provides
feedback to the customer on the information that is
required to complete the acquisition. The KO must also
determine if the acquisition should be set aside for
purchase from certain sources such as small, disadvantaged,
13
minority, or women owned businesses. The KO generally
determines the method of procurement for the purchase
request and assigns the request to a contract specialist
for contract formation. The contract specialist inputs the
purchase request into the Standard Procurement System
(SPS). SPS is an automated computer system that assists
contract specialists in contract preparation. The contract
specialist determines the extent of competition for the
acquisition and develops a potential source list.
“The contract specialist then prepares a synopsis and
solicitation for the acquisition. The synopsis and
solicitation are sent via SPS to the KO for approval. Once
the KO has approved the synopsis/solicitation, the contract
specialist publicizes it by mailing, faxing, or e-mailing
it to companies on the potential sources list, and by
posting it to the Federal Business Opportunities (FBO)
website. Potential offerors receive the solicitation and
provide feedback in the form of pre-award inquiries to the
contract specialist for clarification. The contract
specialist then receives proposals from potential suppliers
and builds proposal abstracts in SPS. The contract
specialist evaluates all proposals and selects the best
value proposal. The contract specialist enters the
pertinent information, e.g., clauses, terms and conditions,
amounts, etc., directly into SPS. SPS automatically
produces a Form 1149 and all supporting contracting
documents. SPS also automatically updates DFAS with all
pertinent contract information. The KO awards the contract
in SPS and the contract specialist distributes the contract
award by e-mail, fax, or mail to the comptroller, customer,
and the contract awardees. Once the contractor receives
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the contract award document, the contract is then signed
and mails it back to the KO, where it is received by the
contract specialist and the document is filed in the
contract file, thus completing contract award.
“If the acquisition is for a supply item, the
contractor produces the item and sends it and the payment
invoice to location(s) specified in the contract. If the
acquisition can be paid for by a Government credit card,
the contract specialist phones the contractor and provides
the credit card number for payment. If the acquisition
requires payment using a check, the contract specialist
mails the certified payment invoice to DFAS. DFAS then
verifies the payment invoice by comparing it with the
original contract information it received through SPS.
DFAS in turn mails a check to the contractor and posts the
payment voucher number to the DFAS website. The contract
specialist checks the website to confirm that the voucher
number is posted and then closes out the contract.”
(Harrigan, Sean, 2001)
C. OVERVIEW OF FASA AND FARA
Prior to FASA, agencies used large single award
(umbrella) ID/IQ contracts to avoid: (1) delays associated
with awarding several individual contracts for each
requirement and re-competing Government contracts, and (2)
the legal challenges of using multiple award contracts. A
single award ID/IQ contract often makes it difficult for
the Government to secure the same price reductions and
contractor performance improvements that can occur if the
contractor were competing against other qualified
contractors throughout the contract.
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The Acquisition Law Advisory Panel, in its 1993 report
to Congress, concluded that many Government requirements
would be unnecessarily delayed unless agencies had the
clear flexibility to enter into delivery order contracts
for products and task order contracts for services. These
contracts allow detailed requirements, definite dollar
values, and the timing of work to be accomplished by
issuing orders as needs arise during the life of the
contract. The Panel recommended that task order and
delivery order contracts be authorized by statute.
Congress recognized that significant procurement
reforms could not be accomplished without providing
agencies flexible contracting tools. Therefore, FASA
provided this flexibility by codifying agencies’ existing
practices of using task order and delivery order contracts,
established a “general” preference for use of multiple
awards, and made the use of multiple awards mandatory for
advisory and assistance services contracts exceeding $10
million and three years in duration. (ARNET ,2001)
1. FASA
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994
significantly changed how the Government does business. As
part of Vice President Gore’s effort to create a
“Government That Works Better and Costs Less” within his
National Performance Review, he presented FASA to President
Clinton in 1993. It was designed to overhaul the
cumbersome and complex procurement system of the Federal
Government, which required costly paperwork for even small
purchases and weeks, sometimes months, of waiting between
order and delivery of goods. 
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The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) was
signed in to law Oct. 13, 1994. Some highlights of FASA
include:
Eliminating most paperwork and record keeping
requirements for acquisitions below $100,000
within the Simplified Acquisition Threshold
(SAT).
Allowing direct “micropurchases” of items below
$2,500 without competitive quotations or
compliance with Buy American Act and certain
small business requirements.
Exempting commercial product procurements from
certain existing as well as future enacted laws,
including exemptions from the submission of cost
or pricing data and the cost accounting standards
(CAS) requirements; establishing an agency
preference for commercial items; and other
continuing initiatives promoting the acquisition
of commercial items to minimize time delays,
research and development, and detailed design
specifications and testing, thereby making
Government procurement easier and less costly.
Establishing a Government-wide Federal
Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET) to convert
a current acquisition process overburdened by
paperwork to an expedited electronic data
interchange system (EDI) readily accessible to
the public. The National Defense Authorization
Act of 1998 repealed the FACNET requirement,
changing it to the use of Electronic
Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI).
Establishing a six-year limitation period for
filing claims under the Contract Disputes Act
(CDA) and increasing dollar thresholds for claim
certification and the accelerated and small
claims procedures.
Reserving all acquisitions over $2,500 but under
$100,000 exclusively for small business concerns,
unless the contracting agency is unable to obtain
offers from at least two qualified small business
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firms.
Expanding the Small Disadvantaged Business set-
aside program to civilian agency procurements.
As a result of the Adderand decision, the set-
aside program has since been refined. It now
includes closer scrutiny rather than a blanket
policy on selection. Criteria for selection also
identifies hub zones -historically under-utilized
business and economic areas.
Establishing a new 5 percent contracting goal for
women-owned small businesses.
Creating a “Small Business Procurement Advisory
Council” comprised of representatives from
federal agencies, which will give high-level
attention and focus to small businesses.
Preserving private contractors’ ability to file
bid protests in the U.S. District Courts and
authorizing federal district courts to obtain
advisory opinions from boards of contract
appeals.
Improving bid protest and contract administration
procedures, particularly by providing more timely
and informative debriefings to unsuccessful
offerors; establishing Government-wide payment
protection for first-tier subcontractors and
suppliers; and extending the authority to use
alternative dispute resolution procedures under
the CDA until October 1, 1999.
Repealing that part of the Walsh-Healey Act
requiring an offeror to certify that it is a
regular dealer or manufacturer.
Requiring evaluation of past performance before
contract award.
Raising the Truth in Negotiation Act (TINA)
threshold for requiring certified cost or pricing
data to a uniform $500,000 for both civilian
agencies and DoD procurements.
Some of the items listed above have changed since
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the law was passed in 1994. This list merely reflects
the initiatives of FASA. (DSMC, 2001)
2. FARA
In 1996, recognizing the importance of information
technology for effective Government, Congress and the
President enacted the Information Technology Management
Reform Act and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act. These
two Acts together, known as the Clinger-Cohen Act, require
the heads of Federal agencies to link IT investments to
agency accomplishments. The Clinger-Cohen Act also
requires that agency heads establish a process to select,
manage and control their IT investments. 
According to the former Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology, the Honorable Paul G. Kaminski,
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, formerly known as
the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 (FARA)
and the Information Technology Management Reform
Act of 1996 (ITMRA), further advance the changes
made by FASA. The Clinger-Cohen Act provides a
number of significant opportunities for DoD to
further streamline and reduce non-value added
steps in the acquisition process. Among the most
significant changes authorized by the Act is a
test of the use of the Simplified Acquisition
Procedures (SAP) for commercial items between the
simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000 and
$5 million. This should allow DoD to reduce its
administrative costs and the overhead costs for
DoD’s vendor base for purchases of relatively low
risk items. This change eliminated Government-
unique requirements previously cited by industry
as a barrier to doing business with DoD. The Act
also provides the authority for contracting
activities to use SAPs for all requirements
between $50,000 and the SAP while the Government
works to fully implement Electronic
Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI).
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The Clinger-Cohen Act also provides substantial
relief from cumbersome processes that add little
value, but significant cost to the acquisition of
information technologies. The passage of the Act
allows DoD to focus on the appropriate use and
management of information technology resources.
It should also reduce the amount of time an
information technology acquisition takes by
reducing the number and frequency of protests,
while moving the Department in the direction of
the use of sound acquisition strategies. (DSMC
2001)
C. BEST PRACTICES AND ACQUISITION REFORM
As a result of FASA, the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy published the following guidance for “Best
Practices” for Multiple-award Task Order Procurements:
During acquisition planning, COs, program
officials, and industry should work together to
develop a clear statement of work.
Continuously seek contractor input to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the ordering
process.
Make a reasonable number of awards, which ensures
competition but keeps the ordering process from
being overly burdensome.
Use an interactive solicitation development
process to:
Shorten RFP development from months to days;
Increase communication between industry and
Government;
Increase understanding of the requirements
through a dynamic interactive approach; and
Use simplified procedures and award documentation
when issuing orders under multiple award
contracts.
The use of performance-based work statements
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should result in more task orders being fixed-
priced.
Consider using oral presentations to reduce lead
time and contractors’ proposal preparation costs.
Use good judgment to ensure that travel costs do
not become excessive.
Plan ahead for oral presentations to allow
sufficient time for scheduling of conference room
space and evaluators attendance.
If written technical proposals are required, use
page limitations.
Developing publications which describe the fair
opportunity and ordering process helps when
multiple award contracts are issued for multi-
agency use.
Past performance on earlier tasks under the
multiple award contract, including past
performance on cost or price control, may be used
to determine which awardees should be considered
for future tasks.
Good communication between the contracting office
and program/technical office is essential when
determining fair opportunity.
Technical/program personnel involved in the fair
opportunity process should be well trained in the
use of multiple award task and delivery order
contracting.
Establishing an automated system to manage task
order issuance makes the process more efficient.
Convene periodic meetings with awardees to
discuss administrative matters, future
requirements, and needed improvements in the




Government Wide Acquisition Contracts (GWACs) are one
of many multiple-award task order or delivery order
contract instruments, which have attempted to streamline
lengthy procurement processes. Particularly, GWACs were
designed to provide sources primarily for information
technology products through contracts that are owned by one
Federal agency, which other specified Federal agencies can
use. There is a limitation on how much of the total
contract value one agency can use. This amount varies and
is determined by the host agency. GWACs allow agencies to
issue task and delivery orders against other agencies’
multiple-award contracts. In essence, GWACs offer agencies
a way to avoid the complicated and lengthy process of open
competition and contract negotiation, which have, in the
past, contributed to long waiting periods for procurements
and bidding periods. These waiting periods incur extensive
administrative overhead costs that are eventually passed on
to the Government. In fact, administrative costs have been
estimated to be approximately $25,000 per contract
transaction. (Dembeck, Chet 2002)
Since 1996, when the National Institutes of Health and
the Transportation Department invented the GWAC, it was
hoped that the GWACs would serve two purposes. The first
was to spread the use of multiple-award task order
contracting authorized in the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act to facilitate commercial competition in
the Government to procure IT services. The second was to
promote the spread of best practices. Purchases made
through GWACs skyrocketed to more than $13 billion in
fiscal year 2000.
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More than twelve agencies operate GWACs. Federal
Sources Inc., analyzed 95,000 task and delivery orders for
information technology orders placed against sixty GWACs.
This analysis showed that the Federal Supply Service’s
(FSS) technology schedules by far accounted for the largest
portion of the GWAC’s income in fiscal year 2000. The
technology schedules amassed nearly $8.1 billion in sales
with 60.8 percent of all activity. FSS charges agencies a
one percent fee generating over $81 million in revenue for
the agency. The General Services Administration’s (GSA)
new Broadband Distance Learning contract ran a distant
second with $1 billion in sales. GSA manages five of the
ten most lucrative contracts. The National Aeronautical
Space Administration’s (NASA) Scientific and Engineering
Workstation Procurement II (SEWP II) Contract, which is
used to purchase computer equipment designed for open
source environments, came in fourth with $451 million, or
3.4 percent of the total sales. According to the study by
Fed Sources Inc., the top 10 GWAC agency users accounted
for more that $11 billion, or 85 percent, of the entire
GWAC market. GSA is also the largest GWAC customer,
spending $4.2 billion, or accounting for 31.2 percent of
the purchases. The Navy followed at 13 percent for
purchases, or $1.7 billion, and the Army was third with




Department Contract Total Percent ofTotal
1 GSA 4.2 billion 31.2%
2 Navy 1.7 billion 13.0%
3 Army 1.6 billion 12.6%
4 Air Force 1.4 billion 10.3%
5 DISA 540.5 million 4.1%
6 Treasury 489.7 million 3.7%
7 Justice 390 million 2.9%
8 DLA 376 million 2.8%
9 VA 326.6 million 2.5%
10 NASA 289 million 2.2%
All others 1.9 billion 14.4%
Total 13.3 billion 100.0%
Based on contract ogligations for fiscal 2000.  Source: Federal  Sources Inc.
Figure 1. Fiscal Year 2000 Contract Obligations
Captured by Federal Sources Inc.
GWAC customers not in the top 10 accounted for only
14.4 percent of sales, or $2 billion.
On the contractor side, technology management adviser
EDS of Plano, Texas was the largest single GWAC contractor
with $726 million in business, representing 5.4 percent of
the market share. Los Angeles-based defense contracting
giant Northrop Grumman came in second at $657 million, or
4.9 percent. Technology firm SAIC, headquartered in San
Diego, rounded out the top three, tallying $655 million in
sales to put it nearly even with Northrop Grumman for
market share. Companies not in the top ten list of
contractors accounted for 65 percent of all spending, which
amounted to $8.7 billion.
GWAC supporters, such as GSA and FSS, defend the use
of these contracts by stating that GWAC offices have a
structured central vantage point from which to develop and
promulgate lessons learned from recurring information
technology requirements to include capturing performance
data that passed through the contracting vehicles. One
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interesting note is that the performance data is generated
locally. At this point, no other agency has visibility or
convenient access to all past and present performance data
generated. With over $13 billion dollars in revenue, to
over 95,000 task and delivery orders for information
technology procurements, and over sixty GWAC schedules,
GWACs have streamlined the procurement process in the IT
arena in accordance with FASA. Despite GWACs’ growing
popularity, questions about bundling have been raised in
official investigations and in formal complaints from the
Small Business Administration. Are there unfair advantages
in competing for these contracts due to over emphasis on
best practices? In the end, is the Government getting the
lowest-price technically available or responsible
responsive, contractor to achieve best value purchases?
The next paragraphs look at the controversy surrounding
these multiple-award contracts.
E. COMPETITION REQUIREMENT VS CONSIDERATION
The second, and probably most important, claim of
GWACs was to promote the spread of best practices, such as
performance-based contracting, that promised better results
from information technology investments. The argument for
why GWACs might help achieve this goal was that GWAC
offices would have a central vantage point from which to
develop and promulgate lessons learned from recurring IT
requirements that passed through the contracting vehicles.
Despite this effort, GWACs have not done much to make IT
contracting more successful or streamlined, according to
Steven Kelman in an article to Federal Computer Week,
November 1, 1999.
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In a report to Federal Computer Week, October 29,
2001, DoD’s Inspector General (IG) indicated that sole
sourcing continues to be a problem, despite continuous
warnings that these problems could result in limitations
being put on the procurement reforms enacted in recent
years. The review of Multiple Award Contracts for Services
found that 66 of 124 task orders in fiscal year 2001 were
issued on a sole-source basis without providing contractors
a fair opportunity to be considered.
During fiscal years 2000 and 2001, the DoD IG found
that 304 of 423 task orders, or 72 percent, were awarded on
a sole-source or a directed-source basis. Only a small
number of the 423 task orders were competed and 82 of these
orders received multiple bids. He concluded that
contracting organizations continue to direct awards without
providing multiple-award contractors a fair opportunity to
be considered.
As a result, DOD was not obtaining the benefits
of sustained competition and the reduced cost
envisioned when Congress provided the authority
for multiple-award contracts. (Kelman, 1999)
The Defense Department is not the only organization
under fire. NASA was flagged for not competing orders. An
audit released in October by NASA’s IG found that 51 of 104
contracts issued by the Johnson Space Center and Langley
Research Center were sole-sourced orders. “The agency did
not receive the benefits of competition and may be paying
more for goods and services than necessary,” according to
the report released September 28, 2001. (NASA, 2001) In
response, procurement officials from NASA stated that they
agreed with the IG report. However, the orders cited in
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the report represent an “effort that was begun, but not
completed, on prior contracts.” Putting those orders out
for bid would have given those pre-awarded contractors an
unfair competitive advantage due to their prior work.
These negative impacts have not only affected competition,
but also influenced undesirable approaches towards small
business concerns.
F. MACS IMPACT ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY
In a Congressional Report written by the General
Accounting Office, small businesses have raised concerns
about whether multiple-award contracts would reduce their
opportunity to receive Federal contracts. Consolidating
requirements, such as awarding large umbrella contracts and
eliminating numerous smaller contracts, creates a situation
commonly known as contract bundling. Multiple-award
contracts have been one way of consolidating requirements,
which Federal officials say reduces administrative costs.
Small business fears that when consolidation results in
very large contracts or contracts that call for performance
over a wide geographic area, smaller firms are unable to
compete effectively. (GAO, 1998) Before discussing the
impact of MACs on small business affairs, the following
paragraphs identify the purpose for small business policies
categories, and their associated Government programs.
1. Purpose for Socio-Economic Policies
On July 30th 1953, Congress continued in its efforts to
strengthen the usage of small businesses by passing The
Small Business Act of 1953 and creating the Small Business
Administration (SBA). The purpose of this Act was to
concentrate entirely on helping solve the many problems
that small businesses were facing. The Government realized
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that it must help in the development of small businesses in
order to promote and keep full and open competition for our
free enterprise system. This Act stated that the
Government should ensure that a fair portion of Government
prime contracts and subcontracts be given to small
businesses. This Act abolished the SDPA and the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the SBA assumed
most of these organizations’ functions.
Five years later, The Small Business Act of 1958,
Public Law 85-536, amended the original Small Business Act
and enhanced the Government’s commitment to Small Business
by recognizing the Small Business Administration (SBA) as a
permanent agency under the Executive Branch. The Small
Business Administration was formed as an independent agency
that was authorized to enter into contracts with other
Federal agencies. Once the SBA entered into these
contracts, it would then subcontract these contracts to
small and economically disadvantaged small businesses. An
amendment to the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 and
the Small Business Act of 1958, Public Law 95-507, further
addressed socially and economically disadvantaged small
business concerns by making it mandatory for prime
contractors to submit small business and disadvantaged
subcontract goals for contracts over $ 500,000 (one million
for construction). These early Acts by the United States
Government laid the foundation in addressing the
Government’s commitment to including small disadvantaged
businesses in the Federal Government procurement process.
Since then, the Government has continued to show its
commitment toward small disadvantaged businesses by
enacting the following legislation:
28
1968 — The Small business Administration 8(a) program
was established to enhance federal purchases from
socially or economically disadvantaged owners of small
businesses.
1969 — Executive Order 11458 established the U.S. Office
of Minority Business Enterprise within the Department of
Commerce with the purpose of mobilizing federal resources
to aid minorities in business.
1971 — Title 41, Federal Procurement Regulations
required all Federal contracts exceeding $500,000 to
contain a clause encouraging contractors to utilize
minority businesses as sub-contractors on a best-effort
basis.
1971 — Expanded upon Executive Order 11458 and Executive
Order 11625 gave the Secretary of Commerce the authority
to: (1) implement federal policy in support of minority
business enterprise programs; (2) provide technical and
management assistance to disadvantaged businesses; and
(3) coordinate activities between all federal departments
to aid in increasing minority business development.
1977 — The Public Works Employment Act as amended by
Congressman Parren J. Mitchell required that ten percent
of each Federal Construction Grant be awarded to minority
businesses.
1977 — Public Law 95-89 increased loan authorizations
and surety bond guarantee authority to minority
businesses.
1977 — The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform
Act required that recipients of financial grants and
their subcontractors establish a goal of 15 percent of
purchases to be awarded to minority businesses.
1978 — Public law 95-507 mandates that bidders for
federal contracts in excess of $500,000 for goods and
services and $1,000,000 for construction, submit prior to
contract award, a plan, which included percentage goals
for the utilization of minority businesses. This law
also contained several amendments to the Small Business
and Small Business Investment Act of 1958.
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1982 — Section 105(f) of the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act is the ten percent set-aside amendment
sponsored by Chairman Parren Mitchell of the House Small
Business Committee. This set-aside provision mandates
that not less than ten percent of all funds appropriated
over the four-year period (1982-1986) shall be expended
with small businesses that are owned and controlled by
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.
1983 — Executive Order 12432, signed by President
Reagan, directs all agencies of the Federal Government to
develop specific goal-oriented plans for expanding
procurement opportunities to minority businesses.
1985 — H.R. 1961, Criminal Penalties for Front
Companies, was introduced by Congressman Mitchell to
address some of the concerns of those who allege that
front companies are injuring minority business programs.
Under H.R. 1961, any false statement knowingly
made to any party for the purpose of obtaining an
8(a) contract, a small business set-aside, a
subcontract awarded under Section 8(d)
subcontracting plan, or a contract awarded under
the ten percent set-aside of the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, would be a
crime punishable by a fine and/or a jail term of
five years.
1986 — Public Law 99-661 is a precedent-setting bill
requiring affirmative efforts by all Government
contractors towards a three-year goal of 5% minority
(disadvantaged) business participation in Department of
Defense procurement. It provides that:
• “To the extent practicable”, each contractor
demonstrate full compliance with the intent of
the legislation.
• Contractors may pay no more than fair market
price (FMP), which may exceed 10% of the market
price.
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• Contractors may be criminally prosecuted for acts
of misrepresentation.
• Contractors must report utilization for all
separate groups that make up the protected class
of minorities.
2. SBA 8(A) Programs and Goals
The Small Business Administration’s Small
Disadvantaged Business Office was established to aid in
achieving the Government’s established goals for small
disadvantaged businesses. This office has several minority
development programs that are intended to help small
disadvantaged businesses become successful in the future.
One of the programs is the 8(a) program. The purpose of
the 8(a) Program is to promote equal access for socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals to participate
in the business sector of the nation’s economy. In doing
so, the SBA encourages business ownership and the
competitive spirit for businesses that are owned by
individuals who are socially and economically
disadvantaged, and to create the opportunity for them to
participate in the Federal procurement system. The 8(a)
program provides Federal Government contracts and other
assistance to small companies owned by socially and
economically disadvantaged persons.
The U. S. Small Business Administration (SBA) acts as
a prime contractor and enters into contracts with other
Federal departments and agencies, negotiating subcontracts
with small companies in the 8(a) Program. Generally these
contracts have an anticipated award value of less than
$5,000,000.00 for Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes involving manufacturing and $3,000,000.00 for all
other SIC codes and are awarded on a non-competitive basis.
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Contracts greater than those amounts are awarded after
competition among eligible 8(a) participants.
To be eligible for the 8(a) program, the small
business concern must be at least 51 percent owned by an
individual(s) who is a citizen of the United States and who
is determined to be socially and economically disadvantaged
by the SBA. Another requirement is for the business to be
managed on a full-time basis by one or more individuals who
have been found to be socially and economically
disadvantaged. In addition, at least one socially and
economically disadvantaged full-time manager must hold the
position of President or Chief Executive Officer for the
company. For the purposes of the 8(a) program, a socially
disadvantaged individual is defined as an individual who
has been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or
cultural bias because of his or her identity as a member of
a group, without regard to his or her individual qualities.
The social disadvantage must stem from circumstances that
are beyond the individual’s control. For the purposes of
the 8(a) program, economically disadvantaged individuals
are socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to
compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due
to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared
to others in the same or similar line of business who are
not socially disadvantaged and such diminished
opportunities have precluded or are likely to preclude such
individuals from successfully competing in the open market.
Typically, socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals include African Americans, Hispanic Americans,
Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and Subcontinent
Asian Americans. Individuals not members of these minority
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groups who can demonstrate that they are socially and
economically disadvantaged also may be eligible.
In an effort to achieve the Federal Government’s
policy of all small businesses having the maximum
practicable opportunity to participate in providing goods
and services to the Government, the Government-wide
Procurement Preference Goaling Program was established. To
ensure that small businesses received their “fair” share,
the SBA negotiates annual procurement preference goals with
each Federal agency and reviews each agency’s results. The
SBA is responsible for ensuring that the statutory
Government-wide goals are met for the entire Government.
The goals for small disadvantaged businesses are as
follows:
Table 2. Fiscal Year 2000 Statistics for Small
Disadvantaged Business Programs.
The goal for... is...
small disadvantaged business
prime contracts
not less than 5 percent of the value
of all prime contract awards.
small disadvantaged business
subcontracts
not less than 5 percent of the value
of all subcontract awards.
women-owned small business
prime contracts
not less than 5 percent of the value
of all prime contract awards.
women-owned small business
subcontracts
not less than 5 percent of the value
of all subcontract awards.
In order for Federal procurement policy to be fair and
equitable for all Federal agencies, the Government-wide
small business goals are established for Federal agencies
as percentages of their annual expenditures. Each agency
is required to submit its proposed goals to the SBA. The
SBA is then charged to ensure that the aggregate
Government-wide statutory goals are met. Currently, the
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statutory small disadvantaged business goal is 5 percent of
the value for all prime contracts and subcontracts. In
addition, the statutory goal is 5 percent for both women-
owned small businesses. The HUBZone statutory goal, which
is defined in the next section of this thesis, was 2
percent in fiscal year 2001, 2.5 percent in fiscal year
2002, and 3 percent in fiscal year 2003. The SBA approves
the final goals that are set by each Federal agency and
monitors whether the agency actual performs against the
established goals. In accordance with OFPP policy letter
99-1, Federal agencies are required to submit their goals
before the beginning of each fiscal year. The Office of
Management and Budget is required to establish a system for
collecting, developing and disseminating procurement data.
This system is the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS).
Accordingly, only data reported to the FPDS on a SF 279 or
SF 281 may be included in a Federal agency’s baseline for
reporting purposes.
In order for SBA to track the goals and actual
achievements, Federal agencies each year provide the SBA
with estimates of the total dollar amount of all prime
contracts to be awarded that fiscal year and estimates of
the total dollar amount of all subcontracts to be awarded
by the agency’s reporting prime contractors. Since fiscal
year 1998, all goal achievements were reported through FPDS
as both a dollar amount and as a percentage of the total
amount to be awarded for each of the categories. At the
end of each fiscal year, the head of each agency is
required to review its FPDS report for correctness and, if
required, submit the appropriate justification to SBA for
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failure to meet specific goals with a plan to achieve the
goals in the succeeding fiscal year.
3. Mentor-Protégé Programs
Another program the SBA has implemented to improve the
opportunities for small disadvantaged businesses to
participate in the Federal procurement system is the
Mentor-Protégé program. The SBA’s Mentor-Protégé program
enhances the capability of 8(a) participants to compete
more successfully for Federal Government contracts. This
is accomplished by encouraging private-sector
relationships, and by expanding the SBA’s efforts to
identify and respond to the developmental needs of 8(a)
firms. The Mentors, which are well-established firms in
the industry, provide technical and management assistance
in the form of technical expertise, resources and other
capabilities to 8(a) firms (Protégé). Mentors can also
enter into joint ventures with the protégés and compete for
Government contracts as prime contractors. A Mentor firm
can also assist the protégé by giving it financial support.
Mentors can own equity interest of up to 40% in a protégé
firm to help it raise capital.
In establishing the Mentor–Protégé program, the SBA
hopes to encourage Government contractor firms in good
standing to assist small and disadvantaged businesses and
enable these businesses to first enter into the Federal
procurement process, and then prosper in such a way that
they may be able to eventually serve as a mentor for other
firms in the future. Since the SBA implemented the Mentor-
Protégé program, other Federal agencies have adopted the
same program. One such program is the Department of
Defense (DoD) Pilot Mentor-Protégé Program. This program
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is similar to the SBA’s program, but it is unique to the
Department of Defense. In this program, DoD encourages
major DoD prime contractors (mentors) to develop the
technical and business capabilities of small disadvantaged
businesses and other eligible Protégés in order to enhance
their contribution to the Department of Defense, thereby
helping DoD in its efforts to achieve the Federally
mandated goals for small disadvantaged businesses.
4. Historically Underutilized Business Zone
(HUBZONE) Empowering Contracting Program
The HUBZone Empowerment Contracting program is
administered by a staff in Washington, D.C., in cooperation
with a field staff located in SBA district offices all
around the United States. The program was established in
order to provide Federal contracting opportunities for
qualified small and disadvantaged businesses located in
designated distressed areas throughout the country.
Fostering the growth of these federal contractors as viable
businesses, for the long term, helps to empower
communities, create jobs, and attract private investment in
these communities. The program encourages economic
development in these historically underutilized business
zones, “HUBZones”, through the establishment of
preferences. The SBA regulates and implements the program
and determines which businesses are eligible to receive
HUBZone contracts. Next, the SBA maintains a listing of
the qualified HUBZone small businesses so that other
Federal agencies may locate vendors. In order to qualify
for the HUBZone program, a small business must meet all of
the following criteria:
• It must be located in a “historically
underutilized business zone” or HUBZone
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• It must be owned and controlled by one or more
U.S. citizens
• At least 35% of its employees must reside in a
HUBZone
A “HUBZone” is an area that is located in one or more
of the following:
• a qualified “non-metropolitan county” (as defined
in section 143(k)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986) with a median household income of
less than 80 percent of the State median
household income or with an unemployment rate of
not less than 140 percent of the statewide
average, based on U.S. Department of Labor recent
data
• within the boundaries of federally recognized
Indian reservations
In establishing the HUBZone Empowering Contracting
Program, the Federal Government has set the following goals
for HUBZone: 2001 - 2%; 2002 – 2-½ %; 2003; and each year
thereafter - 3%. The main idea is that in achieving these
HUBZone goals, the small disadvantaged businesses within
the HUBZone would receive a larger portion of Federal
Government contracts. If this happens, then it also helps
in achieving the overall goal of 5% of all Federal
Government contracts being awarded to small disadvantaged
businesses.
5. Required Subcontractor Plans For Prime
Contractors
One practice that has forced Prime contractors to be
cognizant of the use of Small and Disadvantaged businesses
in dealing with the contracts they were awarded by the
Federal Government is the mandatory subcontractor plans.
In accordance with the Public Law 95-507, all Government
contracts that are in excess of $500,000 ($1 million for
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construction) that offer subcontractor opportunities must
contain the contractor’s plan for subcontracting with small
and disadvantaged businesses. The only exception is if the
prime contractor for the contract is actually a small or
disadvantaged business. If the Government and the prime
contractor are not able to agree on a subcontractor plan,
then the prime contractor is not eligible to be awarded the
contract.
6. Effectiveness of Small Business Programs
In analyzing the effectiveness of the programs that
the Federal Government has implemented to achieve its
overall goal of 5 percent of prime contracts and
subcontracts for Government procurement actions being
awarded to small disadvantaged businesses, the performance
of DoD is reviewed.
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Table 3. Fiscal Year 2000 Statistics for Small
Disadvantaged Business Programs.
Fiscal Year 2000 Statistics for Small Disadvantaged Business Program
Prime and Subcontracting Performance
Sec. 2323, Title 10 U.S.C. Established a 5% Goal for Column 8
Dollars in Millions
























2000* $122,397 $6,957 5.7% $54,858 $2,962 5.4% $9,919 8.1%
1999* $116,715 $7,043 6.0% $52,232 $2,919 5.6% $9,962 8.5%
1998 $109,673 $6,530 6.0% $53,144 $2,984 5.6% $9,514 8.7%
1997 $106,489 $6,697 6.3% $54,429 $3,024 5.6% $9,721 9.1%
1996 $109,489 $6,918 6.3% $47,353 $2,772 5.9% $9,690 8.9%
1995 $110,033 $6,682 6.2% $45,032 $2,600 5.8% $9,462 8.6%
1994 $112,013 $6,114 5.5% $45,364 $2,253 5.0% $8,367 7.5%
1993 $116,007 $6,183 5.3% $44,947 $1,914 4.3% $8,097 7.0%
1992 $117,151 $5,195 4.4% $47,318 $1,777 3.8% $6,972 6.0%
1991 $125,878 $4,423 3.5% $57,053 $1,549 2.7% $5,972 4.7%
1990 $123,821 $4,149 3.4% $54,708 $1,575 2.9% $5,724 4.6%
1989 $120,003 $3,998 3.3% $56,037 $1,302 2.3% $5,300 4.4%
1988 $130,815 $3,631 2.8% $58,799 $1,134 1.9% $4,765 3.6%
1987 $135,340 $3,317 5.7% $53,115 $1,023 1.9% $4,340 3.2%
As shown in the table above, in 1987 the Department of
Defense (DoD) was well below the stated goals for small
disadvantaged businesses, but there was an upward trend.
Since 1992, DoD not only has achieved the stated goals, but
also has managed, on average, to achieve over 161% of its
goals. Looking at this fact, it can be concluded that the
policies and programs that the SBA implemented and the DOD
followed, were the key contributing factors in the DOD’s
overwhelming success in surpassing the small disadvantaged
business goals over the past nine (9) years. However,
further research shows that it is difficult to determine if
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there is a direct correlation between DoD’s implementation
of these programs and the success in achieving the goals.
There is insufficient or inaccurate data to correlate
successes or failures of meeting SBA goals for the Mentor
Protégé’ Program and Hubzone initiatives. However, as
mentioned earlier, in a 1998 GAO report on Multiple-award
Contracts, the Small Business Administration expressed
concerns that contract bundling would hamper Small Business
initiatives and its ability to meet prescribed goals. On
the contrary, GAO concluded that, in the aggregate, across
the spectrum of the Federal Government, small businesses
are competing and their share of contracts has increased
since FASA. Nonetheless, since the report was written in
1998, critics have disagreed.
7. MAC Impacts on SBA Initiatives
Bundling of contracts is a controversial subject with
strong opinions for and against the practice. An article
written by Colleen O’Hara, in November 1999, states that
contract bundling for GWACs (IT MACs) has increased up to
13 percent of all contracts, rising from about 11.5 percent
in fiscal year 1992. A Federal Computer Week article,
“Tough Times for 8(a)s”, September 2000, stated that from
1997 to 1999, the number of small business federal
contracts dropped from 6.4 million to 4.9 million. A
February 2001, Federal Computer World article stated that
Representative Don Manzullo of Illinois, Chairman of the
House Small Business Committee, is concerned about contract
bundling practices. Advocates state that bundling saves
agencies time and money; opponents think that bundling
forms barriers to entry into the procurement process.
“Bundling acts as a gatekeeper. It essentially locks out
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any business that is not an awardee of the bundled
contracts,” says Craig Brooks, president of Electra
International Telecommunications, Bethesda, Md.
There are conflicting objectives dealing with MACs
that may produce unwanted economic impacts on Small
Business goals. As a result of bundling under MACs, small
businesses are at the mercy of larger prime contractors.
The work must flow down to them in the form of
subcontracts. Further research addresses potential
relationships between MAC bundling and the impacts on small
businesses and small business initiatives.
G. SUMMARY
Faced with a declining Government workforce of
procurement officials, a decreasing industrial base by
which to procure supplies and services, fiscal budget
constraints and other fiscal barriers, the Government must
continue to re-engineer buying practices and improve on
best business practices that will continue to place our
country in an advantageous position over the long run.
Business practices for commercial and non-developmental
supplies or services that take up to two years to procure
can no longer be tolerated. Multiple-award contract
instruments are a step in the right direction that can
potentially open opportunities for more competition, better
performance and quicker response to Government generated
requirements. Nonetheless, despite MAC popularity and the
entrance of over 60 additional Government-wide acquisition
contracts (IT MACs), current business practices threaten to
reverse current processes to the pre-FASA era.
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Thus, the potential exists to increase Government
overhead costs and raise prices of commercial and non-
developmental items, while pushing our already declining
commercial industrial base farther away from Government
business. Sections 801 and Section 803 of the Defense
Authorization Bill loom in the shadows of current bills to
swing the procurement pendulum to pre-1994 purchasing. The
next chapter discusses and dissects procurement results of
specific MAC instruments. The investigations and reports
conducted by GAO, the DoD IG and NASA IG give further
insight into MAC procurement impacts on competition,
pricing and socioeconomic concerns.
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III.CURRENT BUSINESS PRACTICES THROUGH MACS
A. PURPOSE
Chapter III evaluates procurement shortfalls of
Multiple-Award Task and Delivery Order Contracts (MACs) by
revealing the buying habits of Federal Buying Agencies.
Over the past four years, increases in sole-source awards
have resulted from the use of MACs to include the bundling
of contracts to streamline procurement processes. These
sole-source awards and bundling impinge on competition,
pricing and SBA business goals, and also frustrate the
intent of receiving Best Value products and services
expected from MAC instruments.
Subsequent paragraphs address successful
implementation of MACs, emphasize why buying agencies are
gaining confidence in Information Technology procurement
solutions, and review the buying habits of agencies within
the Federal Government to determine potential misuses of
these contract instruments. Agencies within DoD and NASA
are the subject of the discussion. Lastly, the researcher
addresses and analyzes the effects of contract bundling as
defined by Congress in a previous GAO report.
B. POSITIVE IMPACTS OF MACS ON REFORM
Purchases made through GWACs soared to more than $13
billion in fiscal year 2000. (Govexec 2001) More than
sixty agencies operate GWACs, and as indicated in Table 1
of Chapter II, have achieved their goal of disseminating
the use of GWACs and streamlining processes while reducing
procurement administrative lead times. This allows
agencies to purchase evolutionary state-of-the-art IT
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solutions in less time than pre-FASA procedures. The
Defense Acquisition University, the school for Government
acquisition professionals in Ft. Belvoir, Virginia,
partnered with GSA to use their “Applications ’n’ Support
for Widely-Diverse End User Requirements” contract,
(A.N.S.W.E.R. GWAC). DAU chose the GWAC prime contractor,
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) to provide integrated
e-learning, knowledge management and information technology
(IT) support for DAU. The contract award is valued at $47
million with a performance award term (incentive) of an
additional three years. Through an interview with Colonel
Bill McNally, DAU released the following comments to
justify its best value decision using the A.N.S.W.E.R GWAC:
• The A.N.S.W.E.R GWAC matched DAUs requirements
more effectively than other procurement
procedures such as full and open competition, and
Federal Supply Schedules
• DAU did not have to select the contractor based
on full and open competition
• The Program Office for the GSA A.N.S.W.E.R GWAC
constantly measured performance for the GWAC
award and on each task order
• Competition at the initial award and also at the
ordering level encouraged high performance
• The A.N.S.W.E.R GWAC met DAU’s needs in terms of
special provisions, pricing arrangements and
incentives (such as award term), etc.
• GSA provided a program office to assist DAU with
administering the A.N.S.W.E.R. GWAC
• The A.N.S.W.E.R GWAC allowed one on one dialogue
with CSC without creating an unfair advantage to
other awardees that facilitated a team
relationship that ensured requirements were met
(DAU, May 2002)
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DAU benefited from the savings of initial startup time
and cost, contract administration, which includes the pre-
award actions indicated in Chapter II, subparagraph B, page
11, and post award administration. The Government
benefited from competition, by allowing the competitive
forces of the market place to establish best value pricing
based on cost, mission capability, and past performance
information. Equally effective, DAU’s Task order through
the A.N.S.W.E.R GWAC required the prime contractor, CSC, to
establish a subcontractor plan to use Small Businesses. As
a result, GSA prevented the possibility of bundling
contracts as stated in Chapter II definitions and explained
in subparagraph F.
C. NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF MACS ON REFORM
Multiple Award Task Order Contracts (MACs) occur when
two or more contracts are awarded from one solicitation.
This allows the Government to procure goods and services
quickly, using streamlined acquisition procedures while
obtaining the advantages of competition. The intent of
multiple award contracts is to establish a group of pre-
qualified contractors that are technically capable of
performing the work to sustain competition among the
contractors, and to obtain the best value on task orders
throughout the contract period. Since multiple award
contracts contain broad statements of work and provide the
contractors little assurance on actual amounts of orders
that will be received, it is crucial that the initial
selection process focuses on technical issues. This
process allows contractors to compete on an equal footing.
When specific task orders are developed with defined
requirements, cost and price should be a substantial factor
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in the selection process. (DoD Audit) Though FASA
authorized Government agencies to use MAC instruments for
indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity purchases, many
reported misuses of these flexible contracts have eroded
the benefits of streamlined processes. The following
reports outline these issues.
1. GAO Audit and Findings
a. Scope of Audit
• On September 30, 1998, the General Accounting
Office conducted a review of multiple-award
contracts awarded by six Federal organizations as
directed by the Honorable John Glenn for the
Committee on Governmental Affairs United States
Senate and the Honorable Carl Levin for the
Committee on Armed Services United States Senate.
• The Senate committees sought to find whether
Federal agencies were providing a fair
opportunity to contractors to receive orders
under multiple-award contracts.
• The six agencies included the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA), the Department of
Transportation (DOT), the General Services
Administration (GSA), the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), and the U.S. Air Force (USAF)
Electronic Systems Center’s Hanscom Air Force
Base operations (ESC/HAFB) and Standard Systems
Group (SSG).
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Table 4. GAO Selected Data on Contracts Reviewed.
 
b. GAO Review Results
• Efforts to provide a fair opportunity to promote
competition for task or delivery orders placed
under multiple-award contracts varied among the
six organizations
• Air Force ESC/HAFB and GSA contracts provided a
fair opportunity for orders placed on the
organizations’ MAC, which amounted to only five
sole-source orders out of 37 orders
• Air Force ESC/HAFB contracts were found to
logically follow on to orders previously
competed. The GSA-requested proposals for offers
on projects were generally less in price than the
Government estimates
• DOT contracts for information technology services
and sole-source orders represented 64% of orders
placed and 20% of total dollars awarded in Table
4. Although DOT met statutory exceptions for
sole source orders, it did not reach the Office
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) guidelines of
obtaining competition on 90% of its orders.
• Until October 1997, NIH normally identified a
preferred contractor when announcing plans to
place orders for information technology services
on MACs. Although a January 1998 policy changed
this system to allow two proposals on each order,
a review of ten orders found that the old system
had not changed.
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• OMB recommended in April 1998 that Federal
procurement regulations be revised to prohibit
the practice of sole source orders under MACs
• DISA received only one proposal per order for
about 44% of the orders placed on its MAC during
fiscal year 1997
c. Agency’s Response to GAO Review
• OMB, DoD, on behalf of the Air Force, and NIH
generally concurred with the results of the GAO
report. DOT did not provide written comments
but, in oral comments, it generally concurred.
GSA also declined to comment.
• OMB is encouraged that agencies are taking steps
to improve their processes for administering
multiple-award contracts, including increasing
attention to the amount of competition for
orders. Written comments are included in
Appendix A.
• DoD agreed that continual review was important to
ensure that MACs promote competition. DoD
activities are revisiting current practices to
ensure that contracts have a fair opportunity to
be considered for orders. Written comments are
included in Appendix B.
• NIH stated that the GAO review represented a fair
assessment of its MACs. NIH has implemented
program improvements to meet “fair opportunity”
requirements. See the comments included in
Appendix C.
Since the GAO report was published in September
1998, Congress and OMB have closely monitored the use of
MACs. The following paragraphs outline departmental audits
initiated by DoD and NASA to review internal MAC
activities.
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2. DoD Inspector General Audit and Findings












Values on pie chart represent number of task order 
actions
Figure 2. DoD Improperly Directed Task Order Actions.
a. Scope of Audit
DoD reviewed 423 multiple award task orders
awarded in FY 2000 and 2001, valued at $451.4 million at
fifteen contracting organizations throughout DoD. These
orders were from eighty-four MACs with a face value of $9.8
billion.
b. Audit Results
• The audit found that 304 of 423 task orders (72%)
were awarded sole-source or on a directed source
basis, of which 264 (Figure 3) were improperly
supported. The value was $312.2 million dollars.
• Contracting officials abused the “broad
discretion” portion of the FAR for task order
awards under multiple award contracts
• Contracting officials allowed “exception” claims
without adequate supporting documentation and
succumbed to program office and internal
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pressures to generate business for their multiple
award contracts
• Contracting officials did not adequately plan
work to ensure that it was suitable for multiple
awards
• The Office of the Secretary of Defense Management
did not properly monitor, evaluate, or analyze
data collected from Military Departments for
multiple award contracts to prevent inappropriate
practices associated with MACs
c. DoD Agency Management Responses
All of the Secretaries and Directors agreed to
the deficiencies noted in the award and use of MACs with
the exception of DMEA. DMEA disagreed with the opinion of
the auditor that contracting officials did not adequately
plan work to ensure that it was suitable for multiple task
order awards.
d. DoD Audit Response
The Auditor responded that out of forty-nine task
orders, thirteen were called competitive while only
receiving one bid, and thirty-six were considered sole-
source. They question the use of the MAC because there was
never any competition. The MACs were designed to ease the
acquisition process for competitors, not to be a means to
obtain sole-source procurements.
3. NASA Inspector General Audit and Findings
Table 5. NASA MAC Activity Table.
Center A. Number of Contracts Reviewed B. Number of Orders Reviewed C. Sole-source orders D. Sole-source orders questioned
Ames 14 88 15 1
Goddard 20 91 13 0
Johnson 17 59 14 11
Kennedy 11 33 9 0
Langley 27 366 90 40
Marshall 6 25 0 0
Totals 95 662 141 52
Awards Values $352,871,955 $139,843,690 $8,677,950
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a. Scope of Audit
• The Inspector General of NASA audited MACs to
determine if their use was consistent with
statutory and regulatory requirements, and in the
best interest of the Government
b. Audit Results
• As indicated in Figure 2, specifically, at
Johnson and Langley Space Centers, contracting
officers issued fifty-one (49%) of 104 sole-
source orders without obtaining adequate
competition
• Forty-eight of fifty-one did not qualify as sole-
source orders.
• Forty-one were a continuation of work performed
under prior contracts.
• Seven orders were follow-on to previous orders
• Three orders had no sole-source justifications
available in the contract files. The Government
did not benefit from lower prices as a result of
the sole-source orders valued at $8,417,611
c. Langley and Johnson Space Center Response
• The period of performance was expiring under the
previous contracts. However, the effort involved
was not completed.
• The effort required under the orders was
consistent with the scope of the new contracts
• The effort required technically complex orders,
and competition of the orders would have
disrupted critical program milestones
d. Auditor Response
NASA found that the Agency’s rationale for
issuing the work as sole-source orders indicates that these
contracts were probably not suitable candidates for
multiple-award contracts in accordance with FAR Sections
16.504(C)(1)(ii)(A) and 16.504(C)(1)(ii)(B).
• FAR Sections 16.504(C)(1)(ii)(A) states:
51
The contracting officer must avoid situations in
which awardees specialize exclusively in one or a
few areas within the statement of work, thus
creating the likelihood that orders in those
areas will be awarded on a sole-source basis
• FAR Sections 16.504(C)(1)(ii)(B):
The contracting officer must not use the
multiple-award approach if only one contractor is
capable of providing performance at the level of
quality required because the supplies or services
are unique or highly specialized
D. EVALUATIVE ANALYSIS OF MAC IMPACTS
NASA and DoD’s sole-source awarding of MACs seems to
be the norm and not the exception as indicated above. FAR
16.505 allows contracting officers to award sole-source
orders to a single contractor under the following
exceptions:
• The agency need for the supplies or services is
so urgent that providing a fair opportunity would
result in unacceptable delays
• Only one award is capable of providing the
supplies or services required at the level of
quality required because the supplies ordered are
unique or highly specialized
• The order must be issued on a sole-source basis
in the interest of economy and efficiency as a
logical follow-on to an order already issued
under the contract, provided that all awardees
were given a fair opportunity to be considered
for the original order
• An order is necessary to satisfy a minimum
guarantee
The following section evaluates the impacts of the
ineffective use of MACs on competition, pricing and socio-
economic goals. (NASA, 2001)
52
1. Sole-Source Impacts on Competition
FASA was designed to provide contracting officers some
relief from TINA (cost or pricing data), allow broad
statements of work, limit contractor protests, and
streamline procurement processes through the evaluation of
best practices mandating that multiple awardees have a fair
opportunity to be considered for orders over $2500. As a
result, the Government can benefit from competition and
lower prices. MACs were not developed to replace or
circumvent full and open competition. In fiscal year 2000,
both NASA and DoD processed over 10 billion dollars through
GWACs. See Figure 1 in Chapter II. On average, over 60%
of the contracts awarded by both DoD and NASA were sole-
sourced contracts, thereby violating the competition
requirements. Both NASA and DoD rendered numerous
explanations as to why they were justified.
Regardless, none of the explanations met the
exceptions requirements of FAR 16.505, and the Government
did not benefit from the savings normally produced by
allowing the competitive forces of the marketplace to
dictate prices. However, many agencies use MACs as a way
to streamline procurement processes at the expense of the
Government. Without oversight or a robust checks and
balances system, agencies will continue to abuse the
system. Both NASA and DoD auditors recommended appointing
an ombudsman for each subordinate agency to review and
oversee the use of MACs and meet locally established quotas
to benchmark competition. Every subordinate agency opposed
this recommendation, stating that this action infringed on
a contracting officer’s discretion. Consequently,
contracting officers must use adequate market research and
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proper acquisition planning to decide if MACs are
appropriate contract vehicles. They must use procurement
planning to determine if a contractor is technically
capable of fulfilling a requirement to prevent
overstated/understated amounts based on incomplete
requirements. These actions should provide the Government
with best value, and a fair and reasonable price.
2. Sole-Source Impacts on Pricing
Agencies should consider the terms, conditions, and
competitive pricing, as well as the administrative savings
of multiple-award task and delivery order contracts.
Agencies are responsible for determining the capabilities
of the marketplace, and whether the focus of an existing
contract will result in an optimal fit between an agency’s
needs and commercial solutions. Therefore, although
contracting officers may find relief from the Truth In
Negotiations Act, under which the contractor is required to
submit cost or pricing data through FASA, they must still
be cognizant of pricing.
Pricing awareness is achieved in the beginning stages
of an acquisition when the requirements are assessed. The
acquisition community must first conduct extensive market
research to assess what is available in the commercial
marketplace to meet the need, with little or no adaptation.
Next, the acquisition community creates a winning
acquisition and procurement strategy that procures
commercial items when they are needed at the most
reasonable price. (I. Guide, June, 1998) This is
especially important in sole-source exceptions where the
competitive forces of the marketplace did not influence
price. Market research must answer the minimum questions:
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• Should this item or service be considered
commercial? If an item is determined not to be
commercial, contract procedures will fall under a
more lengthy procurement process rather than
under simplified acquisition procedures, which
account for fair and reasonable prices
differently. (I. Guide June 1998)
• Why is the commercial item a sole-source? Items
may be sole-source as a result of data rights,
copyrights and patents. They may also fall under
the exceptions as outlined in FAR Part 16.505.
(I. Guide June 1998)
• Is this commercial, sole-source item one of a
family of products?
• How many of the commercial sole source items are
sold to the general public? If the amount of
sales to the Government is higher than the amount
of sales to the public, KOs can leverage volume
buying to negotiate “most favored customer”
prices. If the opposite is true, then market
research will concentrate on the public’s
leverage and compare the Government’s price to
that of the “most favored general public
customer.” (I. Guide, June 1998)
• What is the vendor’s pricing strategy for
commercial items? Two strong factors drive the
pricing. The first is the source’s assessment of
what is the maximum price that the market will
tolerate. This is prevalent with competition.
In a sole-source environment, market pressures
are almost non-existent. The second, cost
recovery plus maximum profit, is used in a sole-
source environment. (I. Guide June 1998)
A logical follow-on step to market research is price
analysis, which is designed to determine if the price of a
certain item or service is fair and reasonable. Services
for detail price analysis can be requested through the
Defense Contact Auditing Agency (DCAA) of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), and in fact, is highly
encouraged. Various methods include Historical Trend
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Analysis, Cost Estimating Relationships, Best Value versus
Lowest Price, Varying in Quantity Analysis, Independent
Government Estimates (IGE), Percentage of Sales Test,
Recurring versus Non-Recurring Considerations and Spare
Parts Breakout. As noted in the previous section, agencies
abused their broad discretion, granted by FAR 16.505, to
determine “fair consideration” of awardees, and failed to
support their actions by articulating their awareness of
pricing for all contractors not contacted before the task
or delivery order was issued.
There was no indication that appropriate market
research or price analysis was conducted. In one example,
where contractors were not contacted to submit proposals,
there was no documentation showing that the contracting
officer knew the labor mix or labor hours that contractors
may have proposed. In 264 of 423 sole-source task orders
generated by DoD, and 48 of 104 sole-source task orders
generated by NASA, contracting officers failed to use a
DCAA auditor or any type of price evaluation techniques to
conduct a more comprehensive price analysis. Instead, they
used a streamlined approach that was inadequate for
determining a fair and reasonable price. As a result, the
Government did not realize any cost savings or best value
purchases.
3. Impacts on Socio-Economic Matters
Undesirable economic impacts have resulted from MACs.
Agencies are taking great advantage of MACs by awarding
some contracts that do not define what work is to be done.
The agencies are putting enormous pressure on companies by
following these practices. These companies are then forced
to spend money not only to bid for a MAC, but to also spend
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more money to aggressively market themselves to win a share
of the contract task orders. In addition, these companies
must quickly hire workers when a task order is received and
just as quickly lay them off as soon as the task is
completed. Managers rightly point out that this is a
recipe for worker-employer mistrust, higher wages, and
lower quality.
A report by the General Accounting Office in September
1998, to Senators John Glenn and Carl Levin, stated that
small businesses have other factors to contend with aside
from cost.
Small businesses have raised concerns about
whether multiple-award contracts would reduce
their opportunity to receive federal contracts.
Consolidating requirements (awarding large
umbrella contracts and eliminating numerous
smaller contracts) creates a situation commonly
known as contract bundling. Multiple-award
contracts have been one way of consolidating
requirements, which federal officials say reduces
administrative costs. Small business advocates,
however, fear that when consolidation results in
very large contracts or contracts that call for
performance over a wide geographic area, smaller
firms will be unable to compete effectively. (GAO
Report 1998)
While small business advocates have raised concerns
about small businesses not being able to compete for MACs,
GAO analysis has concluded that in the aggregate, the small
businesses’ share of Federal contracts has increased since
FASA as of 1998. However, there are varying opinions on
whether or not small business contract awards have
increased or decreased. New York Representative Nydia
Velzquez, a ranking member of the House Small Business
Committee, had this to report:
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• From 1997 to 1999, the number of small-business
federal actions dropped from 6.4 million to 4.9
million, which is a 23% decrease
• Twenty-one federal agencies responsible for 96%
of all federal contracts were graded from A to F
with A being the highest value. No agency
received an ‘A’ rating
• More than half the agencies were given below-
average grades for bypassing small businesses in
favor of large companies
• Contract bundling has cut into the business of
small firms, many of which are owned by
minorities or women
• Smaller businesses must enter into subcontractor
roles with the larger companies that win bundled
contracts. Since bundling leaves small
businesses at the mercy of the larger prime
contractors, it negates all statutory and
regulatory protections
• There is no statutory requirement or penalties if
agencies fail to meet goals (Caterinicchia, FCW
Sept 2000)
GAO’s September 1998 report did not address the impact
of MACs on small business opportunities, but concluded that
small business opportunities for all types of Federal
contracts have increased despite concerns about bundling.
The House Small Business Committee concluded that a decline
of Federal contracts to small business for IT acquisitions
occurred during fiscal years 1997-1999, but there was no
conclusive evidence to indicate that MAC bundling was the
cause. Neither report addressed whether or not MACs have
produced overwhelming barriers to entry for small
businesses. However, evidence of MAC misuse through
improper sole-source requirements was indeed conclusive.
If improper sole-source acquisitions continue, and buying
agencies are not held accountable, the Government will not
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benefit from competition, and will, therefore, never obtain
best value acquisitions that can result in lower or best
value prices, and higher performance over the life cycle of
the acquisition. In addition, other qualified offerors and
contractors, whether large or small, will not have the
opportunity to prove their value to the Government if not
given a fair opportunity to compete.
E. SUMMARY
Despite the controversy surrounding MACs, the
regulations and guidelines are in place to properly award
MACs in a full and open competitive environment. A
competitive environment will provide an atmosphere that
will benefit the contracting officer, the Government, and
most of industry. However, contracting officers must
properly implement these guidelines before awarding sole-
source contracts. Obviously, some manipulation of the
system does occur from agency to agency, but that may not
be apparent to a casual observer. Agency IG offices and
GAO auditors must continue to monitor and ensure that
contracting officers understand and adhere to existing
polices. Chapter IV introduces alternative business
practices through an Advanced Electronic System (AES)
followed by an economic analysis comparing MACs and the AES
in Chapter V.
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IV. ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES THROUGH AN
ADVANCED ELECTRONIC SYSTEM
A. COMMERCIAL TRENDS
The Government is charged with providing a Federal
Acquisition System that delivers the best value product or
service to its customer on a timely basis, while
maintaining the public’s trust and fulfilling public policy
objectives. (Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 1)
Maintaining public trust can be as challenging as
fulfilling public policy in the acquisition system.
Streamlining Government procurement processes while
adapting Internet solutions that will minimize cost and
maximize best value purchases will contribute to
maintaining public confidence.
1. Commercial Business-to-Business Practices
Following the success of eBay and Amazon.com, Internet
companies moved swiftly into the business-to-business (B2B)
market. Internet companies that have built electronic
malls on the World Wide Web make it fast and easy for
suppliers and buyers within the industry to connect. Web-
based transactions are linked to a company’s internal
accounting and finance systems, and paper forms and
ambiguous data entry are no longer a part of the purchasing
process. Data is stockpiled and presented on thousands of
purchases, enabling organizations to better understand what
is being bought and to use that knowledge to negotiate
better deals with suppliers. Despite the stock market
correction in March 2000, B2B solutions are still
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Figure 3. Overview of the Domestic B2B Market, 1999-
2003.
The B2B market ballooned because companies can save
money by moving the purchasing of manufacturing supplies
and operating resources onto the Internet, thereby reducing
redundant paper forms, speeding payment and accounting, and
improving the ability of buyers to compare prices and the
ability of sellers to present products. In addition, the
Internet permits real-time bidding wars in which sellers
compete on price to win buyers’ orders. The Boston-based
Aberdeen Group, a consulting firm, found that most
businesses realize a 300 percent first-year return on
investment in Internet procurement. As a result, B2B firms
are now very excited about the business-to-government (B2G)
possibilities. (Wyld, 2000)
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2. Commercial Business-to-Government Practices
B2Gs are quickly being drawn to the Federal
Government’s $200 billion+ annual expenditure for goods and
services. Most Internet companies collect a percentage of
transactions conducted using their websites, software or
services. With approximately 31 million procurement
transactions in fiscal year 1999 alone, Internet companies
consider the Federal Government to be an enormous avenue
for profit. Industry analysts predict that Federal, State
and local government spending on e-government hardware,
software and services will grow from $1.5 billion this year
to $6.5 billion in 2005. Nearly $4 billion of that will be









Source: Data from Bowles, 
2000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Dollar Amounts in Billions
Figure 4: Public Sector Procurement in Real Dollars, Federal vs.
State & Local Government, 1993-1999
State and Local Government Federal Government
Figure 4. Public Sector Procurement in Real 1999




FASA is a combination of several initiatives in
acquisition reform. Many of the reforms in the Act
represent significant changes in how companies will be
doing business with the Federal Government. Most of the
important changes are Electronic Commerce (EC) requirements
and the creation of the Federal Acquisition Computer
Network (FACNET). Through FACNET, small businesses have
easier and more efficient access to Government contracting
opportunities throughout the country. Currently, SBA and
the Defense Logistic Agency’s Central Contractor Registry
(CCR) database, which are mandatory small business registry
sites, will merge databases to reduce the redundancy in
registering as of October 31, 2002. (Central Contract
Registry, October 2001)
In 1996, the Clinger-Cohen Act was formed to provide
the authority for contracting activities to use Simplified
Acquisition Procedures (SAP) for all requirements between
$50,000 and $5 million while the Government works to fully
implement Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange
(EC/EDI). Commercial customers have always been able to
obtain products and services faster and cheaper than the
Government. Government customers buying items priced at
over $2,500 normally wait at least 45 days to acquire their
purchases. As a result of the Internet, the infrastructure
is available to mirror commercial practices and current
legislation through the Clinger-Cohen Act, which
facilitates that process. To remain current in
technological developments, the Government must continue to
partner with contractors to maintain fluid and dynamic
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procurement systems while avoiding obsolescence and
providing best value to the Government.
1. Review of Current Procurement Practices
Chapter II described the current procurement practices
as a myriad of processes taking in excess of 180 days, or
sometimes years, to procure and deliver products and
services to the end-users. The contracting office spends
costly amounts of time and money advertising the action and
preparing formal solicitation documents for each purchase
order generated by the end-user. However, with the advent
of FASA procurement, offices were permitted to use
streamlined processes through MAC instruments, which
eliminated the need to advertise and prepare formal
solicitation documents for individual requirements.
As a result, MACs reduced procurement administrative
lead times (PALT). Despite the successes of MACs in
streamlining procurement processes as stated in Chapter
III, MACs have been the subject of misuse, as buying
agencies used MACs to avoid competition, which negatively
impinged on pricing, while marginally meeting socio-
economic goals. The Defense Authorization Act Section 803
threatens to reverse the initiatives of FASA by increasing
the requirement to compete all orders over $100,000
dollars.
2. Proposed Procurement Practices
Current Internet technology has proven applications in
the acquisition environment. However, most electronic
contracting systems, such as the NASA SEWP II MAC, GSA
Advantage, GSA e-mall, GSA A.N.S.W.E.R GWAC, the DoD EMALL,
and other Internet based MACs have attempted to automate
existing contracting systems rather than create new
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processes and methods for changing the character and nature
of contracting that facilitates competition, produces lower
prices, and meets socio-economic goals. An advanced
electronic system can capture improvements by using the
authority of a single prime contractor through a properly
structured Single Award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite
Quantity (SA ID/IQ) Contract, which will engage over
207,000 multiple sub-contractors, or vendors as opposed to
a few prime contractors under a MAC.
The operational capabilities of the system should
include the following:
• Be easy to use by any Internet user
• Be open for use by non-warranted Government
ordering officers
• Integrate and expedite Government billing, bulk
funding, and ordering and shipping with
commercially established systems
• Be adaptable to military exercises and
contingency operations
• Be a cradle to grave system that allows the
Government to procure goods and services as well
as auction or dispose of old and obsolete
property
• Allow Small and Disadvantaged businesses to use
the system, upload their goods and services, and
interact with the Government without having to
invest large amounts of capitol in IT related
solutions
• Make the system transparent to State, Federal
Government, International and Commercial Business
purchasers
• Easily capture past performance information from
all users of the system while sharing the
information with other Government purchasing
offices
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• Increase the capability to conduct market
research
• Automatically generate specific Government forms
such as a DD350 (procurement activity report)
• Contain security countermeasures that will
discourage fraud and prevent unethical misuse
(Tudor Oral Brief Video, 2001)
3. What Is An Advanced Electronic System?
An Advanced Electronic System (AES) is a commercially
designed system. It allows the Government to identify the
requirements and conduct electronic market research in
accordance with commercially established practices. A
buyer is able to check over 200,000 vendors through a
single Internet site. Once a product or service is
selected, the user loads an electronic shopping cart and
forwards it to a prime vendor who engages the
subcontractor. The process uses a single award indefinite
delivery, indefinite quantity (SA ID/IQ) contract that
increases competition through extensive consideration of
all sources, and reduces procurement administrative lead
times from months to weeks. In addition, the customer can
use an AES to dispose of Government property using an
electronic auctioning system that will sell unusable (but
necessary) equipment online while returning the revenue
generated from the auction to the customer. An AES is a
cradle to grave system enabling contracting officers and
ordering officers to procure products and services, and
dispose of obsolete inventory while maintaining fiscal
discipline.
4. Advanced Electronic System Functionality
Description
The following describes the system operations.
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a. Requirements Generation and Market Research
If a system user is attempting to purchase office
supplies and various other items, the system works in the
following manner. The user activates the purchasing system
and enters a password. The user is presented with a screen
asking whether to buy or sell. The user selects ‘buy’ by
clicking with the mouse. The user enters a descriptive
word, such as ‘document holder’, into the search field.
The system returns a listing of all vendors that sell
document holders along with a digital photo of their
products. The system provides additional information such
as information identifying the vendors where all past
purchases have been made. The information is presented in
graphics such as bar charts that readily present the
information in an understandable and cogent manner. Along
with this, all the past performance information on the
vendors is displayed on a simple one to five rating scale.
This type of information provides a treasure
trove for ordering officers to consider all the potential
vendors for any particular product or service. This
capability is substantially beyond all current Government
contracting systems. Every vendor registered under the CCR
is accessible in the AES. (Tudor, 2001)
b. Billing and Funding Interoperability
Once the user selects the supplier of the
required supplies or services, the shopping cart is
forwarded to the resource manager. In a few moments, the
shopping cart returns with a fund cite (accounting data)
attached. The user forwards the shopping cart to the prime
contractor, who in turn, electronically contacts the
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various sub-contractors and delivers the orders to them.
In a day or two, the user has the capability to click on
the shipping button to track the orders. After the orders
have arrived and have been inspected, the billing process
begins. With the AES, vendors are paid electronically in
mere days rather than the multiple months current
Governments systems take. (Tudor, 2001)
c. Past Performance Information
After the items have arrived, the system prompts
the user to rate the supplier on a simplistic scale of one
to five on the transaction. This rating information
becomes part of the AES database for all other contracting
officers, contracting specialists and ordering officers to
review in the future. The advantage of the AES is that all
the information is immediately available to any potential
user. There is no need to exit the system to find this
type of information. In addition, the information is
readily accessible at any stage of the purchase process.
If, after the items are used, one fails, the user
has the capability to return to the past performance
information screen and change the rating from a five to a
two or to any other number less than 5. The system
modifies the database so that anyone else using the system
is aware of the problem with the product. The user can
even choose to enter a written description of the problem.
The supplier, of course, can respond in the system to the
rating and comment. However, the rating and comment
remain, along with the contractor’s response, for all to
see. (Tudor, 2001)
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d. Bulk Funding Capability
A variation on the funding process is to allow
users to bulk fund their accounts. This allows the user to
avoid the time delay associated with obtaining fund cites.
This is especially useful before the end of the fiscal year
when time is of the essence. The system keeps track of the
bulk fund, constantly informing the user as to the status
of funds.
e. Automated Statutory Forms Generated DD350,
and Small Business Issues
Each contracting action must be reported at the
end of the fiscal year. This requirement takes the typical
base support contracting office two labor months to
complete each year. This report is processed through the
DD 350 form. The AES automates the DD 350 reporting
process by using the information generated at the time of
the purchase. There is no additional work effort required
of any contracting office. This DD 350 is the mechanism by
which contracting offices are rated on whether they have
achieved the small business set aside goals.
There are many small business issues described in
preceding chapters. All of these issues are resolved by
the AES system. For example, the problem of using
particular set aside categories (i.e., small disadvantaged,
women owned, Hubzone, 8A vendors, etc.) is completely
satisfied by the AES cascading set asides. A contracting
officer designates the particular set asides in a
descending priority list. As the purchase of the document
holder is processed, the system automatically reviews the
first designated set aside category. If there are no
vendors available within that category to satisfy the
70
requirement, the system searches the next group. In turn,
if there are no vendors available in that group, the system
continues through all the categories until it reaches an
unrestricted vendor. (Tudor, 2001)
f. Contingency and Military Exercise
Functionality
The DoD is famous for conducting the same
exercise year after year. Under normal procurement
systems, a contracting officer begins the contracting
process to support that exercise approximately six to nine
months before it begins. Most of the effort is a
repetition of the previous year’s contracting activity.
The AES records the purchases made the previous year and
provides them to the contracting officer. That person in
turn can simply review the previous year’s purchase, modify
it, or select a repeat of the purchases. This reduces the
contracting support necessary for a major military exercise
down to mere moments.
Another capability of the AES is its potential to
track purchases on a real time basis. For example, if a
commander is preparing to conduct a contingency operation,
he can view all the purchases for support of that
operation. He knows when all the items have been
purchased, how much in aggregate has been spent on the
entire operation, and when the items will arrive in his
area of operations. When that operation is completed, the
commander can take advantage of the disposal function and
sell all the surplus supply items. This money is returned
to the commander’s fund accounts for usage on other
purchases. This capability will relieve tremendous
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problems associated with terminating actions in an area of
operation. (Tudor, 2001)
g. Procurement For Services
The AES has the capability to order services from
multiple vendors. The services can be either negotiated or
selected from a pre-defined list of templated services.
For example, grass cutting at a base can be easily broken
down into square yards with a firm, fixed price per yard.
The purchaser then indicates the number of square yards to
be cut, the system multiplies it against the pre-submitted
prices, and the order is placed with the vendor. This type
of commercially based system orders services far faster
than any Government based system. (Tudor, 2001)
h. Inventory Tracking
The AES system has inventory tracking ability and
alerts inventory managers to any shortages in the
inventory. Then, a recommendation is made to the user to
purchase an amount necessary to return the inventory to its
proper levels. The user has no greater burden other than
to accept the recommendation. Since the original purchase
was made through the system, there is no search necessary
for the restocking purchase. This allows inventory
restocking to be performed in mere moments.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter began with an introduction to the
concepts of business-to-business (B2B), and business-to-
government (B2G) marketplaces and the benefits they provide
to both public and private sector organizations. The
chapter also reviewed the current procurement practices by
outlining limitations of current processes in comparison to
the benefits a new system could offer. A detailed
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description of the proposed new process followed, beginning
with requirements generation, and ending with inventory
tracking.
The intent of this chapter was to familiarize the
reader with the need for this type of system and a
description of the benefits the Government will derive from
using the new system. It provides a rough outline of how
the system will operate and gives an assessment of the
current capabilities of industry to provide this service.
The current procurement process is inefficient and
cumbersome and provides marginal benefit to the agencies
using it. In addition, despite the advances in MACs, they
contain weaknesses. As a result, a SA ID/IQ with a
commercialized procurement system can improve upon the
weaknesses of MACs, while strengthening acquisition reform.
Since this system is theoretical, no data can be
extracted to conduct a Net Present Value Analysis, Cost
Benefit Analysis or Cost Benefit Evaluation. Instead,
Chapter V provides an economic analysis that compares both
the behavior of vendors, herein referred to as firms
selling within a MAC, and the Advanced Electronic System.
The discussion will result in a better understanding of the
procurement environment that favorably or unfavorably
influences competition and pricing while meeting socio-
economic goals.
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V. ECONOMIC IMPACT COMPARING BOTH MACS AND THE
ADVANCE ELECTRONIC SYSTEM
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Both the MAC and AES are ID/IQ contracts that are
structured to simplify the purchasing process to acquire
commercial-off-the-shelf, non-developmental products and
services that are frequently in demand. The major
differences between the two systems are simple. MACs have
multiple prime vendors with the opportunity to sell to the
Government on an indefinite quantity and or indefinite
delivery basis. The AES is a SA ID/IQ that allows one
prime vendor to engage 273,786 sub-contractors in providing
supplies and services on behalf of the Government through
an e-commerce system. The AES is a commercial e-commerce
system resembling e-Bay, amazon.com, or Ubid.com that can
operate in a B2G or B2B environment.
Figure 5 of this chapter demonstrates the procurement
stages of both the MAC and AES. (NASA’s Scientific and
Engineering Workstation Procurement III GWAC was chosen to
represent the procurement stages within a MAC.) The SEWP
II was one of the few MACs that NASA audited in fiscal year
2000 and that excelled under its scrutiny with no negative
findings. The new SEWP III was awarded in July 30, 2001 to
twelve prime vendors who will provide computer
workstations, servers, and a variety of support
peripherals. SEWP III is valued at four billion dollars
over a five-year period. Each vendor is expected to
deliver orders to the end user within thirty days of an
established delivery order. The AES will be awarded for
fifteen years, with the potential of achieving a major
share of the Government’s 200 billion dollar market within
five years. Both contracting instruments will initially
take at least six months to establish in order to meet the
requirements of full and open competition. Once
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established, Government end users will be able to procure
products in less than thirty days. Each contract
instrument serves to streamline procurement processes for
Government buying agencies, but vendors will behave
differently under each contract; and their distinctive
effects on competition, pricing and socio-economic issues
will influence the Government’s ability to achieve best-
value procurements.
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Figure 6. Advanced Electronic System.
B. AES VENDOR BEHAVIOR
Firms will produce the level of output where marginal
cost (MC) equals marginal revenue (MR). Firms will always
look to maximize profits. Firms are constantly searching
for ways to generate revenue to cover fixed and variable
costs. More and more firms are discovering that selling to
the Government is appealing. During a recent small
business briefing by GSA, the researcher spoke with
numerous businesses whose commercial affairs were suffering
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from the current economic slowdown. Over fifteen firms
were new to Government procurement and were attempting to
become certified as an 8(a), Hubzone, or small
disadvantaged business. As a result, many firms perceive
an opportunity to share in profits resulting from
Government spending.
Firms selling to the Government using the Advanced
Electronic System resemble regular competitive firms.
Buyers and sellers, i.e., Government contracting officers
and firms, are well informed about the products or services
sold. No barriers exist to entering the Government market
and all 207,500 vendors within the CCR database will have
full access. Firms under an AES producing identical
products will have an opportunity to have their products
considered by the Government. Contracting officers will be
able to fairly consider price and cost, at a minimum,
before choosing a vendor. In comparison, the SEWP III
contract will be awarded to only twelve firms. This is a
fairly normal number for GWACS, but it clearly falls far
short of the large number of firms available to the
contracting officer under the AES.
Since there are many firms in the industry, no one
firm will significantly affect market price, particularly
with commercial-off-the-shelf items (COTs). This can be
demonstrated with MR. MR is the change in total revenue
and total revenue is price times a firm’s output (P X q).
As q increases, P decreases. Therefore, the impact of any
one firm on market price will depend on the firm’s
importance to the industry. Suppose market demand is given
by P= 55,000-Q/10. Industry output is 50,000, and industry
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price is $50,000. If total industry output is divided
equally among all firms in the industry, and one firm
doubles output, the impact on market price depends on the
number of firms in the marketplace. This is illustrated in
the table below. Since the AES will have sufficient firms
within its purchasing system, MR does not have to consider
any change in P. Therefore, firms can sell as much as they
like at the current market price.
Industry Output= 50000 Industry price= 50000
# of Industry Firms Output/Firm Q if 1 Firm Doubles Output Industyr PriceChange in Price
1 50000 100000 45000.00 5000.00
2 25000 75000 47500.00 2500.00
12 4166.67 54167 49583.33 416.67
1000 50 50050 49995.00 5.00
2600 19.23 50019.23 49998.08 1.92
3000 16.67 50017 49998.33 1.67
10000 5 50005.00 49999.50 0.50
Table 6. Firm’s Impact on Price.
Firms under most ID/IQs are Firm Fixed Price
agreements that will not allow price increases. Despite
the contractual constraints, firms have no incentive under
the AES to raise prices. Contracting officers and other
buying authorities are required to be well informed of a
firm’s products as there are many other choices. Under the
SEWP III GWAC, only twelve firms sell IT solutions to the
Government. Under the AES, there can be as many as 2600+
IT firms. As illustrated in the aforementioned table, one
unit of increase for each firm will affect industry price
by only $1.92. Most firms, when competing for Government
contracts, will price their products below commercial
prices assuming that they are producing where MC=MR.
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Therefore, there is no incentive to raise or lower prices.
Furthermore, unlike other electronic procurement systems,
AES is a hybrid system since the prime vendor is allowed to
sell B2B, which will draw more consumers, who can purchase
at Government-competed prices.
1. Short Run Behavior
Supply and demand will drive the market. Firms are
assumed to be price takers since their influence on price
is small. Like most commercial firms, they are profit
maximizers. In other words, profit maximizing firms will
produce where P=MR=MC. When profits (π) are greater than
zero, firms will continue to enter the industry as they
expect to receive a share of those profits. Since the only
requirement under AES is to register under CCR, firms will
willingly enter the industry.
Contracting officers are looking for best-value
pricing, or a price that will offer the best performing
product or service. It is important that the AES assist in
market research and pricing analysis as indicated in
Chapter III so that current dollars can be spent wisely.
Why is this important? The most efficient firms are
profitable firms whereas the least profitable firms are
less efficient. When a contracting officer submits a
request for a quote or proposal (RFQ and RFP), a well
informed request will cause firms to perform, produce and
enter the industry where MR=MC if > 0. Since firms are
not required to provide the Government certified cost or
pricing data under an ID/IQ contract, it will be difficult
for the Government to detect if Government expenditures are
being spent on inefficiencies. Market research and price
analysis will be a crucial feature in short-run
π
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procurements, and Government Buying Agencies will have to
depend on the market place, i.e., AES, to weed out
inefficient producers. An IT firm’s behavior is described
in the following model:
• First, identify the firm’s MC curve. MC is the
rate of change (i.e., derivative) of Total Cost
(TC) with respect to q. TC= Average Total Cost*
a firm’s output (ATC*q). Thus, ATC=
350/q+500+10q=> TC= 350+500q+10q2=> MC=500+20q
• The producer’s price is P= 300+2Qs (Qd represents
the Government’s demand and Qs represents the
producer’s output). The Government’s price is P=
2100-Qd. Industry price and output occur where
the industry supply and demand curves intersect.
Therefore, set producer’s price and Government’s
price equal. 2100-Qd=300+2Qs => 1800=3Q=> Q=600,
P= $1500
• Individual firms will operate where P=MC within
AES. Thus, given P and the firm’s MC:
1500=500+20q=> 1000=20q=> q=50
• Profits are the difference between Total Revenue
and Total Cost =TR-TC => = (P-ATC)q. From ATC
in the model, when q=50, ATC = $1007. Thus, π=
(1500-1007)50 = $24,650. Since >0, firms will




Figure 7. Short Run Supply Model for 12 Firms.
2. Long Run Behavior
The AES under current contractual agreements will
operate for at least fifteen years with four option years.
The following model demonstrates long run behavior:
• As firms enter the system, excess profits of
$24,650 will fall as supply increases. In
equilibrium, =0. =(P-ATC)q => (618-618)*6 =0π π
• When Qs = Qd, firms maximize , and =0, the
industry is in long run equilibrium
π π
As firms maximize P=ATC=MC at the breakeven point,
350/q+500+10q=500+20q=> q= 5.92, P=$618, Qd=1482. Long run
equilibrium can support 247 firms.
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Figure 8. Long Run Equilibrium.
As mentioned previously, firms perceive that
Government purchasing provides excess profits. However,
the opposite is true. No excess profits exist. Government
buyers will purchase commercial or non-developmental items
in larger quantities from fewer firms and those non-
producing firms will quickly exit the Government market and
re-enter the commercial market or simply go out of
business. Therefore, the frequent entry of newer firms and
the exiting of non-performing firms will occur. There are
currently more smaller firms entering the Government market
than larger firms; therefore, long run equilibrium will
affect small businesses the most. To date, 184,334 small
businesses are selling products and services to the
Government. This accounts for over 89% of Government
procurements. This number is expected to increase. (Pro-
net Helpdesk, 2002) Many firms, mostly small business
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firms, look to Government procurements to offset their
inability to maintain profitability in the commercial
industry as a result of the recession.
Small firms, through SBA, designate themselves as
8(a), Hubzone, or small disadvantaged businesses to compete
for procurements of <$100,000 that are set aside for small
business by law. (Far Part 19.5) As 184,000 small business
firms compete for a limited pool of set asides they will
quickly compete away the profits produced by these set
asides. Profits will decrease to zero and small firms will
exit the Government industry.
As a result of perfectly competitive behavior, firms
producing for the Government within the AES meet the
criteria for technical efficiency. Thus, for firms to stay
in business, they must control costs to produce or provide
those products and services. Those firms that control cost
will remain and provide the best value in the long run. As
noted in Chapter III, contracting officers from DoD and
NASA injected barriers that prevented the Government from
experiencing optimal production through unprecedented sole-
source task and delivery orders. The contracting officer’s
behavior in this instance restricted input markets and
prices, which prevented the market from adjusting properly.
An AES will benefit the Government by not restricting input
markets and input prices from adjusting, while allowing
Government buyers to maximize utility and allowing output
prices to adjust. An AES can produce efficient output,
allowing contracting officers to make best value decisions
as the system permits perfectly competitive behavior.
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C. MAC BEHAVIOR
Figure 9. NASA SEWP III MAC.
1. Game Theory
Within a multiple award environment, only a few firms
produce many slightly different products. Firms within
MACs will behave as oligopolies. Like firms within perfect
competition and monopolies, they too want to maximize
profits and will produce where MC=MR. So, what is the
difference? This is the only model in which strategic
interactions are crucial. MAC firms are few in number and
they will affect the MR curve. They have all competed and
have been awarded the opportunity for further task and/or
delivery orders from Government buyers. As members of an
oligopoly, firms can monitor a competitor’s actions and
determine whose actions increased or decreased prices
within the market. Since strategic interactions are
involved between firms, no one model exists that can
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capture all behavior. In fact, to graph MR would be
difficult. One of the most popular ways to understand firm
interactions is through Game Theory. Game Theory is the
theory of optimal decision making with two or more decision
makers. In the case of the NASA SEWP III MAC, there are
twelve independent decision makers, all with conflicting
objectives. Game Theory assumes that each decision maker
is rational and seeking to maximize his outcome. Each side
has a decision variable it controls, but the outcome of the
decision making effort depends on the choices made by all
sides. The objectives of the opposing sides are considered
to be strictly conflicting in that a gain for one side must
lead to a loss for the other. Two of the many game
strategies within Game Theory are MAXMIN or MINMAX. This
is normally seen when firms bid or submit proposals for
awards. Game Theory is also useful in studying
interactions between firms to win task or delivery orders.
Firms will respond to the actions of their competitors by
deciding whether to advertise, lower prices, offer
discounts and rebates, etc., to win a share of the
Government’s dollar. For example:
• Firm A and Firm B are two of ten firms awarded a
GWAC, but Firms A and B have yet to win a task
order under the award. Firms A and B must raise
awareness of their product or service to achieve
needed revenue for the firm; however, the firms
will attempt to raise awareness only if it is
advantageous to do so. Both firms are
independent and assumed rational in their
thinking. Each firm’s objective conflicts with
the objective of the other firm. Assume Firm A
has decided on price and is deciding whether to
advertise. Its decision will depend on the
effects on sales. Assume Firm B decides whether
to lower prices. Its decision will depend on the
effects on profits. There is very little
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difference between each firm's products;
therefore, some aggressive actions must be taken
to win future task orders.
               FIRM B
Lower Prices Prices Remain
FIRM A Advertise 2 3 MAXMIN




Figure 10. Game Theory MAXMIN, MINMAX.
• The most commonly assumed strategies are MAXMIN
and MINMAX
• With MAXMIN, a firm maximizes the minimum payoff
it gets, that is, the payoff when the other firm
acts to give the first firm its worst outcome.
• With MINMAX, a firm attempts to minimize its
opponent’s maximum payoff while its opponent
attempts to maximize his own payoff.
• Firm A picks course of action 2 that maximizes
its minimum possible payoff. In other words,
Firm A is pessimistic because it assumes that
whatever action it takes, Firm B will take the
action that gives Firm A the lowest possible
payoff.
• Firm B, choosing MINMAX, picks course of action 2
that minimizes Firm A’s maximum possible payoff.
Firm B is optimistic because it assumes that
whatever action it takes Firm A will take the
action that gives Firm B the highest possible
payoff.
• When MAXMIN and MINMAX are equal there is a
saddle point or pure optimal solution that
optimizes the best use of both firms resources
indicated by 2.
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• Firm A’s optimal strategy will be to advertise as
it will gain the most with minimal impact to
resources
• Firm B’s optimal strategy will be to lower prices
as it stands to lose the least by avoiding doing
nothing at all
The model in Figure 10 is a simplistic display of how
firms interact with each other within a MAC environment.
Firms may also assume that their competitors would continue
doing what they were doing despite their actions, as in the
Cournot-Nash theory. Nash is the winner of the Nobel Prize
in Economic Science portrayed in the movie “A Beautiful
Mind”. As a result of different assumptions, oligopoly
models may arrive at different long run equilibrium prices.
KOs, as they generate requirements for procurements, should
be aware of how firms behave so as to apply appropriate
business practices that will offer firms incentives to
produce, price and perform most advantageously for the
Government.
2. MAC Sole-Source Task and Delivery Orders Produce
Monopolistic Behavior
The Government, through its contracting officers, has
the ability to influence a firm’s behavior within a buying
relationship. As discussed in Chapter III, contracting
officers use their influence and broad discretion to select
sole-source task and delivery orders within DoD and NASA.
DoD sole-sourced 62% of its task orders while NASA sole-
sourced 46% without demonstrating some type of price
awareness to determine fair and reasonable pricing. As a
result, firms no longer mimic oligopolies; firms behave
like monopolies. However, firms' behavior in a sole-source
task or delivery order environment do not necessarily
resemble strict monopolies. Here is why. First, sole-
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source firms under MAC task or delivery orders can not
charge the highest price the market will bear. In fact,
MACs prohibit firms from raising prices, but allow firms to
lower prices.
Second, under MACs the KO still has a choice to buy
from other MAC awardees despite the fact that the KO chose
in many cases not to. In a true monopoly the KO has no
choice for there is only one firm; therefore, the KO
becomes a price taker. However, as a result of a task or
delivery order the KO remains the price setter. The KO set
the price ceiling during the source selection process prior
to awarding the MAC. In the case of the NASA SEWP III MAC
there are twelve awardees; therefore, entry into and exit
from the industry as a result of sole-source task or
delivery orders are not necessarily blocked. In fact, the
sole-source firm is well aware of the other eleven and will
be obliged to lower prices, deliver timely products and
services, and perform above and beyond expectation to
maintain its sole-source relationship with the KO.
Finally, KOs must remain aware that sole-source task
or delivery orders do not save Government resources. That
is, sole-source firms will marginally lower prices only to
maintain a sole-source relationship. The sole-source price
will be higher than competitive quotes from the other
eleven firms; therefore, the savings resulting from the
difference between the sole-source price and the
competitive price will never be realized by the Government.
KOs are not only charged with buying on behalf of the
Government, but also are also charged with freeing
Government resources that can be used elsewhere to minimize
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public expenditures. As a result of poor spending
practices reported by the DoD IG and NASA IG, over $320
million is no longer available to be used elsewhere.
The same behavior can be seen through contract
bundling of multiple award ID/IQs, which increased 19%
during the last ten years. GAO in its September 1998 audit
maintained that there is not enough evidence to suggest
that bundling is a problem, while SBA claimed an annual
loss to small business of $13 billion dollars per year from
bundling. Somewhere between 0 and $13 billion lies the
truth. Regardless, the AES will minimize SBA’s concerns
over the unintended consequences of bundled contracts as
bundling is virtually nonexistent within AES. Small
business firms will have the same opportunities as larger
firms without having to wait for larger firms to share
Government business through sub-contracts and manage the
cost burden of competing and making large capital
investments just to enter a Government system with no
guarantee of award. Instead, the AES encourages smaller
firms to optimize resources to compete along side other
firms for position based on merits and capabilities.
D. SUMMARY
Chapter V discussed the behavior of firms within the
multiple-award environment and the Advanced Electronic
System. Firms are influenced to behave competitively
within the AES, while firms responded as oligopolies under
properly executed MACs, and somewhat monopolistically when
awarded on a sole-source task order basis. Further
discussion revealed that the AES met the criteria for
technical efficiency as firms behaved perfectly competitive
and produced where MC=MR. Lastly, properly structuring
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contractual agreements to give firms an incentive to
produce the desired output is key to best value selections.
When KOs use improper business practices, firms have the
incentive to charge only those prices to maintain sole-
source relationships with marginal outputs as demonstrated
with sole-source MAC task and delivery orders. Chapter V
demonstrates that the AES has the greatest potential for
achieving the appropriate levels of competition and pricing
while meeting socio-economic goals.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSION
As addressed in Chapters I and II, procurement
procedures were described as lengthy, inefficient and
highly regulated, thereby preventing the end user from
receiving timely products or services that perform to end
user standards. Also, Chapters I and II defined and
discussed the advent of FASA and other policies to improve
Government business practices resulting in the development
of streamlined contract instruments and procedures. MACs
and GWACs are the products of post 1994 legislation that
quickly gained popularity across all Government buying
agencies allowing contracting officers to streamline
procurement processes from years to under a month for
commercial, commercial off-the-shelf and non-developmental
products and services. However, buying agencies used these
streamlined procedures to not only reduce procurement
administrative lead times, but to circumvent competitive
practices, which negatively affected small business
concerns, pricing and competition. The consequences of
this noncompetitive behavior resulted in Congress directing
DoD, the Federal Government’s $200 billion buyer, to issue
a final ruling on implementing Section 803 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 on October
25, 2002 to all DoD agencies. (See 67 Fed. Reg. 65505)
The rule reverses contracting officer’s broad
discretion to fairly consider all MAC or GWAC awardees
prior to issuing a task or delivery order. In fact, the
rule requires contracting officers to receive at least
93
three offers for task orders greater than $100,000. (News
Brief no. 02-10-2, 2002) In fiscal year 2001, MACs
generated revenue of over $60 billion. Consequently, if
the minimum requirement is not met, the burden on the
Government could increase to 600,000 more contract actions,
which will increase costs, increase procurement
administrative lead times, over burden an aging and
declining acquisition workforce, and produce higher prices
for the Government. (Dembeck, 2002)
If the Federal acquisition system is to mirror
commercial practices and embrace reform as not just another
blinking word, it must re-engineer procurement processes
that allow the public dollar to flow freely within the
Government Marketplace. AES is the operational tool that
can address a strategic change in re-engineering
procurement. As analyzed in Chapter IV and V, AES
introduces a less regulated business alternative that will
allow the Public’s dollar to flow more freely within the
marketplace while preventing much of the negative
influences of contract bundling and sole-source awards
while optimizing the Government expenditures. Despite the
potential for procurement re-engineering, AES will be short
lived if it does not identify a “Champion” to minimize the
threat of political stakeholders who oppose and may
threaten the survivability and progress of AES. Potential
opposing stakeholders include GSA, whose FSS system is
subject to Defense Authorization Bill Section 803, and
Office of the Secretary of the Navy Research, Development &
Acquisition, whose SEAPORT system is one of many eMalls and
DRMO operations.
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Stakeholders that will gain the most from the AES are
the major military buying commands within DoD who are the
requirement generators and users of the products, and SBA
who has often voiced dissatisfaction with Federal
procurement practices as mentioned in previous chapters.
As demonstrated by the life cycle model on Figure 12, the
benefits of AES can become easily clouded among the
plethora of current electronic systems. To overcome this
dilemma, a Champion must support the system. (Haga, 2001)
The Champion, i.e., the person with the greatest mix of
power, whether political or intellectual, must leverage
that power to minimize the negative impacts from
stakeholders with conflicting objectives while selling the
benefits of this system to those who need it. In addition,
AES must be supported by a robust marketing plan that will
target innovators, such as SBA and the major military
buying commands who stand to gain from this system.































The key to minimizing the risk of stakeholders with
conflicting objectives is to rely heavily on implementation
of a robust Marketing Plan, which can be effectively
achieved through Marketing Management. The Program manager
or Contracting Officer Technical Representative (COTR) will
benefit from the following actions:
• Verify the Naval Postgraduates School’s strategic
direction and implement a Marketing Plan that
supports it
• Establish a Marketing Management Team through the
Naval Postgraduate School Resources. Team should
include Strategic Management and Marketing
Professors for oversight.
• Reexamine and validate a previous marketing plan
authored by MBA students as a guide for future
marketing requirements
• Establish an integrated product team (IPT)
through the MBA program to perform a Business
Case Analysis that will capture and establish the
proper metrics and account for the Total
Ownership Cost (TOC) of the program. The team
should include:
• Financial Expertise
• Information Technology Expertise
• Strategic Management Expertise
• Contracting and Contract Law Expertise
• Major Military Buying Command Input
• Gain product creditability and began involving
political stakeholders early through the use
professional publications targeting innovators
such as SBA and their political advocates as well
as major military buying commands:
• Articles in professional acquisition
magazines




• Naval Postgraduate School Website
• International Magazine
• Direct contact with users
• Institute for Supply Chain Management
Quickly identify a “Champion” for the program and
establish advocacy early. Candidates are Senators or
Representatives of SBA over site committees, Senators and
Representatives of the Prime vendor responsible for
creating AES.
C. SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
• What are the current acquisition problems and
issues associated with current procurement
practices of MAC instruments to meet the
requirements of competition provide best value
prices and meet socio-economic goals? To what
extent can an advanced electronic system improve
on those procurement problems and issues?
Chapters I and II explicitly reinforced the fact that
the present procurement practices for commercial,
commercial off the shelf, and non-developmental products
and services take too long to procure and deliver to the
end user. The contracting office spends costly amounts of
time advertising the action and preparing formal
solicitation documents for each purchase order generated by
the end-user. This translates to higher administrative
costs, higher prices and at times marginal performance.
The AES is a commercial system with Government unique
features with ease of use similar to Amazon.com, ebay.com,
Ubid.com, etc. The system engages a SA ID/IQ contract
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allowing the Prime vendor to interface with suppliers for a
fee for service. As a result, the Government receives its
goods or service in less than thirty days. In addition,
the system allows the user to dispose of Government
property through an auction function that not only reduces
overhead and inventory cost for the Government, it allows
the Government user’s activity to retain revenue from the
sale. AES is a cradle to grave system that allows buying
agencies to maintain fiscal discipline while producing best
value procurements.
2. Secondary Research Questions
• Why have Government-wide Acquisition Contracts
(Type of MAC or GWAC) become the procurement tool
of choice for a plethora of Government agencies?
Since FASA was passed in 1994, MACs have generated
over $60 billion in revenue. MACs’ popularity derives from
the fact that full and open competition is no longer
required for multiple awardees as long as task and or
delivery orders fairly consider all awardees without
prejudice. Current standards for delivering products and
services to the end user is less that thirty days as
indicated in Chapter V by NASA SEWP III standards. MACs
have become popular because they reduce the burden of
administration by bundling requirements for buying
agencies, which has led to great controversy within the
legislative branch and Small Business Advocacy Groups. As
a result, more regulations under Defense Authorization Bill
Section 803 have imposed additional competition
requirements. Lastly, Buying Agencies offering MACs to
other Federal Buying Agencies are retaining fees for
services to manage task or delivery orders for prospective
users.
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• Why has the misuse of these GWACs become a
political target for Congress and the Small
Business Administration (SBA)?
Buying Agencies have used MACs not only to streamline
full and open competition, but also to avoid competition.
Unintended consequences have resulted. As described in
Chapter III, the DoD IG discovered that 72% of task orders
were inappropriately sole-sourced. The NASA IG contended
with 49% of its task orders, with a total dollar value of
over $320 million, not follow appropriate procedures.
Agencies within DoD and NASA did not perform any market or
price analyses to justify the costs, and as a result, the
Government did not benefit from the potential savings of
the purchases.
Lastly, the advent of contract bundling has caused
uproar within SBA and small business advocacy groups (even
though the GAO contends, in a 1998 report on MACs, that the
Federal Government has maintained its socio-economic goals
and that there is no supporting evidence that bundling has
caused any negative affects on small businesses as whole).
The SBA insists that for every 100 bundled contracts, small
business lose 60. As a result, small business has lost $13
billion a year in revenue. With small businesses being
over 179,000 out of 207,000 of the Government’s supplier
base, the lack of competition and the discriminating
affects of bundling have raised congressional concerns over
the Government’s dwindling industrial base.
• What advantages/solutions can an advanced
electronic system bring to the current
procurement system and Acquisition Reform?
Vendors are required to register with the Central
Contracting Registry to sell to the Government particularly
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DoD. An AES using the CCR data, results in small
businesses not having to make large investments in capitol
or IT infrastructure. In comparison, MACs typically cost
vendors as much as $200,000 just to formally respond to a
solicitation, which will not guarantee an awarded contract.
As indicated in the Chapter V, each of these systems
will cause different economic behavior. Under AES, vendors
will behave perfectly competitive, thereby allowing
quantities of supplies and services to be procured
efficiently. Sole-source MACs behave like monopolies. As
a result, MACs have become over regulated. MAC vendors set
prices as high as the market will allow while the
Government deprives itself of any savings associated with
competitive behavior. AES allows the dollar to flow freely
as if it is operating in a commercial market place. As a
result, the mass entry of vendors through the CCR creates
an incentive to control cost, which allows efficient firms
to remain and inefficient firms to exit the system. The
Government benefits from competition through lower prices,
bundling becomes unnecessary, full and open competition is
satisfied, and best value decisions become the norm and not
the exception.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This exploratory study has only begun to uncover the
growing body of knowledge on E-commerce and the potential
of the Internet to facilitate Government acquisition.
Important areas for further research are:
• Legal issues for internet procurement for the
Government
• Financial models supporting efficient E-
Government procurement
100
• Security for E-Government surrounding
authentication and electronic signatures.
• Accountability and reporting issues concerning
the AES
• Analysis of the effectiveness concerning the NPS
research contract
101
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
102
APPENDIX A. LETTER FROM OMB
103
104
APPENDIX B. LETTER FROM DOD
105
106






Bermejo, Veronica P., “Pro-Net Statistics”, US Small
Business Administration, October 22, 2002.
Caterinicchia, Dan, “Tough Times for 8(a)s”,, Federal
Computer Week, September 18,2000.
Central Contractor Registry Control NO. 8000-581,
“Integration of PRO-Net and Central Contractor Registry”,
Retrieved October 21, 2002 from the World Wide Web:
http://www.dot.gov/ost/m60/ProNet_CCR_8000-581.htm.
Cohen, Barry L., “Commercial Pricing Manual”, National
Contract Management Association, Copyright 1998.
Defense Acquisition Desk Book, “Acquisition Planning”,
National Guard Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 7.105,
January 19, 2000.
Defense Acquisition Desk book, “Best Practices for
Collecting and Using Current and Past Performance
Information”, Statutory and Regulatory Basis, May 2000.
Dembeck, Chet, “DoD Buying Rule ‘Will Cripple’
Contracting”, Federal Times, May 20, 2002.
Dorobek, Christopher J., “NASA Centers Sole-Sourcing
Flagged”, Federal Computer Week, October 25, 2001.
Eagle Eye Publishers, “The Impact Of Contract Bundling On
Small Business”, Office of Advocacy Small Business
Administration, Fiscal Year 2001.
Federal Acquisition Regulation.
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 1994, “Understanding
FASA”, Retrieved November 14, 2002 from the World Wide Web:
http://www.federalmall.com/fasa.html
Haga, William, “Lecture On A Champion For Innovation”,
Management of Information Technology, Naval Postgraduate
School, Winter Qtr 2002.
111
Harrigan, Sean, “A New Approach To Property Disposal Within
The Federal Government”, Thesis, December 2001.
Harris, Shane, “Market for Governmentwide Contracts Booms”,
Government Executive Magazine, August 27, 2001.
Kelman, Steven, “First Streamlining, Know Results”, Federal
Computer Week, November 1, 1999.
NASA SEWP III Ordering Information, “Scientific and
Engineering Workstation Procurement”, Retrieved October 16,
2002 from the World Wide Web:
[http://www.sewp.nasa.gov/info/ordering.shtml.].
Office of the Inspector General Department of Defense,
“Multiple Award Contracts For Services”, Audit Report 2001-
189 to the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, September 30, 2001.
Office of the Inspector General NASA, “Multiple Award
Contracts For Services”, Audit Report IG-01-040, September
28, 2001.
Office of the Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, “Commercial Item Handbook (Version 1.0)”,
Acquisition Initiatives, November 2001.
Popkin, Joel and Company, “Small Business Share of Economic
Growth Contract# SBA-HQ-00-C-0001”, US Small Business
Administration, December 14, 2001.
Rider, Melissa, “DoD Issues Final Rule Implementing Section
803 Competition Requirements For Multiple Award Services
Contracts”, News Brief No. 02-10-2, October 25, 2002.
Tillett, Scott L., “IT Contract Bundling Pinches out Small
Firms”, Federal Computer Week, August 30, 2001.
United States General Accounting Office, “Acquisition
Reform Multiple-award Contracting at Six Federal
Organizations”, Report to Congressional Requesters,
September 1998.
Wakerman, Nick, “Concerns Growing About GWAC Competition”,
Washington Technology, October 16, 2001.
112
Walsh, Edward J., “COMMITS Gives Small Companies work in
Information Technology”, Department of Commerce, Copyright
Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association,
October 1999.
Washington Technology, “The Procurement Pendulum”,
Retrieved December 8, 2001 from the World Wide Web:
[http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/12_13/news/12794-
1.html].
Woznick, Pat, “Acquisition Plan For Internet Purchasing,
Billing, Delivery and Auctioning Services”, Department of
Interior, October 2001.
Wyld, David, “The Auction Model: How the Public Sector Can
Leverage the Power of E-Commerce Through Dynamic Pricing”,
October 2000.
113
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
114
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. Marine Corps Representative
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
4. Director, Training and Education
MCCDC, Code C46
Quantico, Virginia
5. Director, Marine Corps Research Center
MCCDC, C4ORC
Quantico, Virginia
6. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn:
Operations Officer)
Camp Pendleton, California
7. Professor Ron Tudor
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
8. Professor David R. Henderson
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
9. Commander Elliot C. Yoder
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
115
